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This dissertation comes at a time of difficult economic recovery for the United
States. The unemployment rate hovers just below eight percent, partially the result
of an incredible amount of involuntary job loss during the Great Recession. These
recent job losers face a bleak economic outlook including long periods of suppressed
earnings and numerous future job losses. This dissertation invokes novel theory and
empirical analysis to help understand the experience of displaced workers, and to
derive the implications of these experiences for the aggregate labor market.
Chapter II of this dissertation shows that sheer misfortune can account for the
entirety of earnings losses experienced by displaced workers. Since workers can look
for jobs while employed, they move up the rungs of a job ladder. Identical unemployed
workers start in employment relationships that are, on average, less profitable than
their jobs prior to separation. Since it takes time for newly hired workers to move up
the job ladder, this induces a slow recovery in earnings after displacement.
This model matches well the earnings recovery of displaced workers observed in
the data, which in large part is attributable to the model’s ability to match observed
wage dispersion. As a result of serial correlation in displacements, this framework
also delivers the empirical decomposition of earnings losses into lower wages and
lower employment. This framework is consistent with aggregate worker flows and
1
empirical establishment-level fluctuations in total factor productivity.
Chapter III investigates the implications of job displacement for the aggregate
labor market over the business cycle. The framework features a burst of layoffs at
the onset of a recession, consistent with the data. Since poor quality employment
relationships are destroyed at the beginning of a recession, the average match-quality
rises initially (cleansing effect). Due to fewer posted vacancies and lower job-finding
rates, the average match-quality begins to fall (sullying effect).
In a simpler version of the baseline model that features no on-the-job search, I
demonstrate a trade-off between matching observed wage dispersion, with a large vari-
ance of idiosyncratic shocks, and matching the observed volatility of unemployment,
which requires small fluctuations in idiosyncratic productivity. The model presented
in Chapter II alleviates these trade-offs by allowing match-quality to be relatively
low in new hires. This allows for a large mass of jobs to exist near the destruction
threshold. With the baseline calibration, which matches observed wage dispersion,
the model delivers significant amplification of aggregate productivity shocks due to
the important job destruction margin. The model also delivers substantial propaga-
tion of aggregate productivity shocks due to the slow movement of workers up the
job ladder. Increases to the separation probability confirm some of these findings.
Chapter IV uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to investigate two
popular empirical specifications used in the displacement literature, and to present
the earnings recovery post-displacement for different sub-groups of individuals. The
chapter outlines the two approaches used and describes the difference between them.
In particular, the specification that uses the never displaced as a control group implies
much larger earnings losses than a specification that uses those not displaced in a given
year as the control group. The analysis shows that the earnings losses seem to be
universal, affecting workers in low-paid and high-paid industries and in a variety of
occupations, the young and the old, and workers with varying amounts of education.
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It also shows that a period of unemployment is equally detrimental to a worker’s
lifetime earnings as a displacement event. These facts lend credence to matching the
average earnings losses using a model with ex-ante homogeneous workers, where the
reason for job separation is unspecified. Finally, this chapter presents new evidence on




Job Ladders and Earnings of Displaced Workers
2.1 Introduction
In the United States, displacements (e.g. layoffs) affect many participants of the
labor market. According to the Displaced Worker Supplement of the Current Popu-
lation Survey, 6.9 million workers with at least three years of tenure experienced job
loss due to layoff from 2007 to 2009 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). An additional
8.5 million persons were displaced from jobs they had held for less than three years.
Davis and von Wachter (2011) (henceforth DV) find that 16 percent of prime-aged
males with three or more years of job tenure experienced a job displacement event
from 1980 to 1985.
In conjunction with the high incidence of displacement, there now exists a long
and distinguished literature documenting large and persistent earnings losses asso-
ciated with displacement. Despite heterogeneity in the findings, post-displacement
earnings losses seem almost universal, affecting men and women, workers in all major
industries, the young and the old, and workers with varying amounts of tenure. As
an example, DV find that at the time of displacement real earnings fall sharply, and
even twenty years after the time of displacement annual earnings are 10-20 percent
below pre-displacement earnings.
The model presented in this chapter provides an explanation for the magnitude
4
and persistence of post-displacement earnings losses. The first part of the explanation
is the presence of a substantial job ladder through the presence of match-specific
human capital. The job ladder captures the idea that workers suit some jobs better
than other jobs, and it takes time for workers to find the jobs for which they are well
suited. Together with poor quality matches among first jobs, the job ladder prolongs
earnings recovery after displacement as unemployed workers enter poor employment
relationships and search for better matches while employed.
The model also endogenously generates serially correlated displacements, which
slow down workers’ climb up the job ladder because each displacement event sends
workers back to the first rung on the ladder. The model captures the following in-
tuition: compared to their job prior to displacement, workers might not be as well
matched in their first job coming out of unemployment. This poor fit results in tenta-
tive new employment relationships and small downward movements in productivity
(demand) can terminate these relationships. This serial correlation coincides with
empirical work by Stevens (1997) who finds that multiple additional job losses are an
important part of a workers’ post-displacement experience. In the years following an
initial displacement, she finds that serially correlated displacements explain much of
the persistence and magnitude in lowered earnings. The serial correlation also helps
the model match the decomposition of lost earnings into reduced employment and
lower wages.
Aside from matching the observed earnings time-path and serially correlated dis-
placements, the model also matches several other moments of the data. The calibrated
job ladder delivers realistic wage dispersion as documented by Hornstein et al. (2011),
and this goes a long way towards explaining the success of the proposed framework.
Since all agents in the model are ex-ante homogeneous and the model is stationary,
misfortune or “bad luck” can account for all the earnings losses associated with dis-
placement. The model also matches the empirical decomposition of earnings losses
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into reduced wages and employment, empirical establishment-level fluctuations in
total factor productivity, as well as the pattern of employment-to-employment tran-
sitions after displacement.
The literature has rarely applied search models to the experience of displaced
workers. The work of DV comes closest to the work presented here. They show
that a standard Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model, and a slightly more sophisticated
model found in Burgess and Turon (2010) (henceforth BT), cannot explain the ex-
tent of losses observed in the data. The model presented in this chapter differs from
BT in two crucial ways. First, as described in the previous paragraph and consistent
with empirical observation, workers recently transitioning from unemployment to em-
ployment face higher hazard rates of separation into unemployment than workers in
established employment relationships. This serial correlation causes cycles of job loss
and can raise the costs of one displacement. All workers in the model of BT face the
same hazard rate into unemployment. Second, the model presented here delivers re-
alistic wage dispersion as documented by Hornstein et al. (2011). This realistic wage
dispersion implies a substantial job ladder, far “longer” than the job ladder found in
BT, and it takes time for workers to move from a poorly suited job to a very well
suited job.
Pries (2004) stands as another closely related paper. However that analysis pro-
vides only a qualitative discussion about displaced worker earnings, whereas this
chapter presents a quantitative exercise that matches well the empirical results on
displaced worker earnings and provides calibrated values for parameters of interest.
Furthermore, my story hinges on a job ladder and on-the-job search, both of which
Pries (2004) omits. Hence, the baseline model presented here can speak to issues, like
employment-to-employment (E-E) flows before and after separations, and the extent
to which job switches account for the recovery in earnings post displacement, which
Pries’ model cannot address. In particular, my model suggests increased E-E flows
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after displacement as workers climb the job ladder in search for a better suited job.
Section 2.5 presents evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) that
corroborates this implication of the model.
Den Haan et al. (2000b) investigate a class of models without on-the-job search
and conclude that the productivity of a match must drift upwards in order to explain
the wage and employment evidence presented by displaced workers. Due to rising
within-match productivity their framework requires implausibly large productivity
shocks to induce a displacement. With on-the-job search, productivity within the
match does not have to grow over time as wages can rise from E-E transitions. Hence,
the model described in this chapter can match the evidence on displaced workers with
a reasonable productivity process. Exogenous separations also mitigate the need for
implausibly large productivity shocks. Low et al. (2010) present a similar model to
the one described here, with on-the-job search, match-quality and search frictions.
Their model predicts a relatively quick recovery of earnings in the year following a
layoff. For the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, the model presented here
delivers greater persistence in earnings losses.
The framework presented here does not incorporate adverse selection; workers do
not vary ex-ante by ability. Unemployed workers are all identical. The reason for this
is twofold. First, von Wachter et al. (2011) take up the issue of selection extensively,
controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics, sorting, as well as negative
selection on level and trend differences. These authors conclude that, although the
estimated losses vary depending on the exact specification, the baseline approach
presented in this chapter provides a reasonable account of the earnings experience of
displaced workers. Second, one of the purposes of this project is to highlight that,
despite ex-ante homogeneity among workers, the losses from displacement can be
large and persistent. This means that misfortune or “bad luck” can account for all
the earnings losses associated with displacement.
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Given the difficulty of finding a search model that delivers the observed earn-
ings time-path of displaced workers, the following analysis constructs a model and
chooses parameters to fit this prominent empirical fact. The ability of the model to
match the persistent earnings losses of displaced workers is an achievement in and
of itself. Many comparable models cannot deliver this persistence. Nevertheless, in
addition to successfully capturing this dimension of the data, the model also matches
several moments of the data that it was not calibrated to match. These include
the decomposition of earnings losses into reduced wages and employment, empirical
establishment-level fluctuations in total factor productivity, as well as observed wage
dispersion and the volatility of earnings within matches. The framework also delivers
the pattern of E-E transitions after displacement and the observed serial correlation
in displacements.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The intuition for the framework, the
calibration of the model, and the main results of the analysis regarding the earnings
of displaced workers and serial correlation in displacement appear in Sections 2.2, 2.3,
and 2.4 respectively. Section 2.5 discusses the implications of this calibrated model
for a range of un-targeted outcomes. Section 2.6 presents a discussion about the
inadequacy of alternative versions of the model. Section 2.7 summarizes and draws
lessons for future research.
2.2 The Model
This section presents a theoretical framework of job search and provides intuition
for the model’s key implications.
2.2.1 Model Introduction
The work on search and matching by Mortensen, Diamond and Pissarides provides
the foundation for this chapter. Two quantities characterize every match: the quality
8
of the match and idiosyncratic productivity (demand). The framework incorporates
endogenous privately efficient separations, which means that worker and firm act
to maximize their joint value, as well as exogenous separations. In this model all
unemployed workers are identical and workers are endowed with linear utility (risk-
neutrality).
2.2.2 Setup
A partial equilibrium model serves as the basis for analysis. Workers look for jobs
and firms post vacancies to attract workers. Unemployed workers receive utility from
leisure and encounter vacancies at an exogenous probability pU . Employed workers
receive a flow payment w and produce a flow output. Employed workers participate in
on-the-job search and contact vacancies at a different probability pE.
1 All employer-
employee matches are characterized by two state variables: match-quality denoted
by y, and an idiosyncratic component denoted by x that can be interpreted as either
productivity or demand. The product of x and y (x · y) provides the flow output of
the match. When an unemployed worker contacts a firm, the match draws an initial,
non-stochastic, match-quality equal to a fixed and deterministic y0. Match-quality
remains constant within a job. Setting match-quality to y0 in all new matches implies
that there exists a set of entry-level positions that all workers start in. This coincides
with what Doeringer and Piore (1971), and more recently Martins et al. (2010), call
“port-of-entry” jobs; jobs into which employers are consistently observed to hire new
workers. On a more technical note, with variation in initial y, unemployed individ-
uals reject offers and thus the job finding rate is not equal to the unemployment-to-
employment (U-E) rate. The data do not help us distinguish unemployed individuals
who have rejected low offers and those who have not received any offers. In the model
1The differing job contact probabilities on and off the job may result from differing levels of search
intensity exhibited by the employed and the unemployed. The model presented here abstracts from
the reason behind this difference.
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all unemployment is frictional.
All initial idiosyncratic productivities (demands) are fixed at a deterministic value,
x0, and then exhibit persistence within a match and evolve according to Fx(x
′|x).
Setting x to x0 in all new matches follows Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In this
model the match-quality, y provides a mean productivity level within a match and x
provides some variance around this mean productivity. Over time on-the-job search
results in offers to the employed with probability pE and match-quality drawn from
y ∼ Fy(ỹ). This induces a job-ladder that agents climb over time. This can be
interpreted as finding more suitable jobs within the same firm (promotions) or simply
learning specific skills and moving onto jobs that are better suited for the worker.
In this sense, y captures the acquisition of firm specific human capital. Resetting y
to y0 in all new matches from unemployment captures the idea that workers lose all
firm-specific human capital during unemployment.
The idiosyncratic component delivers endogenous flows into unemployment; when
the realization of the idiosyncratic random variable is low enough, the worker and
the firm decide to part ways. The worker prefers to flow into unemployment and
search for a new vacancy, and the firm prefers to let the worker go and find a new
worker from the pool of searchers. Involuntary endogenous separations on either side
of the market do not occur in this model. Whenever there exists positive surplus in
a match, the worker and firm can negotiate a wage both parties find agreeable. The
model does incorporate exogenous separations, however.
2.2.3 Timing of Events within a Period
Within each period, events among unemployed workers unfold according to the
following timing. At the outset of a period firms post vacancies to recruit unemployed
workers, and workers look for jobs. When workers contact open vacancies the worker
and firm consummate the match. New matches wait until next period to produce,
10
where δ denotes the discount factor. For established employment relationships the
timing for workers and firms is as follows. First, firm and worker bargain over the
wage. Second, production occurs and the firm pays the worker. Third, the exogenous
separation shock occurs with probability ps. Fourth, the idiosyncratic component, x,
undergoes a shock. Finally, workers receive outside offers with probability pE. If an
employed worker receives a favorable outside offer, he moves to the poaching firm.
If an employed worker receives no outside offer, the firm and the employee decide to
preserve the match or separate.
2.2.4 Bargaining
At the beginning of each period, every worker-firm pair bargains over the wage
that the firm pays the worker for production. This model features a standard linear
surplus sharing rule, so that the worker receives a fraction, β, of the total surplus and
the firm receives the rest of the total match surplus. If an employed worker receives a
favorable outside offer, he moves to the poaching firm, and the wage is renegotiated.
In this case, the worker uses unemployment as his outside option, not the match value
at the previous employer.2 If an employed worker receives an outside offer that does
not induce a switch, the worker cannot use that outside offer to negotiate with his
current employer. Section 2.8 outlines a model with efficient rigid wages, similar to
a framework found in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993). In that model, workers can
use their current offer to bargain with an outside firm, and they can use outside offers
to raise their wage at the current firm. This alternative model delivers very similar
results to the model that features the simple surplus sharing rule. In order to remain
2Nagypal (2007) also uses this convenience in an on-the-job search model. In the setup of Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) workers can use the surplus at their previous firm as an outside option.
That setup includes no idiosyncratic productivity so that all wage changes within a firm result from
outside offers. Including idiosyncratic productivity into this type of model gives the efficient rigid
wage model presented in Section 2.8. Also, Shimer (2006) points out that with on-the-job search the
simple surplus splitting rule may not be Pareto efficient. Given that the efficient rigid wage model
in Section 2.8 delivers qualitatively similar results, I suspect that amending this model’s bargaining
structure will not yield substantially different conclusions.
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consistent with previous work, the benchmark model in this chapter implements the
standard surplus sharing protocol used in the literature.
2.2.5 Intuition for the Partial Equilibrium Model
Before discussing the formal model equations, this section provides a simple de-
scription of the model dynamics and gives the reader intuition for the main results.
The model delivers a slow recovery in earnings post-displacement for three reasons.
First, immediately post-displacement the calibrated model suggests that workers take
jobs with lower match-qualities, compared to their pre-displacement jobs and the av-
erage match-quality among employed workers. Second, in conjunction with a low
match-quality among first jobs, the job ladder introduces persistence in earnings;
it takes time for employed workers to find good quality matches. Third, low post-
displacement match-qualities mean that newly created jobs are likely close to the job
destruction threshold. This makes it more likely that these matches will be destroyed,
resulting in multiple displacements and serial unemployment. This serial unemploy-
ment effect dovetails with empirical work by Stevens (1997) who finds that multiple
job losses explain some of the persistence of earnings losses.
2.2.6 Bellman Equations
This subsection deals with the formal recursive equations of the model.
2.2.6.1 Value of Work to the Employee
The value of work satisfies the following equation:
12
W (x, y) = w + δ(1− pE)(1− ps)
∫









max{U,W (x′, y),W (x0, ỹ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker moves to unemployment,
stays at current firm,




The value of work is a function of two state variables: the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity x and the match-quality y. The first term on the right-hand side is the flow
payoff from working, which is the current wage: w.
The second term on the right-hand side corresponds to the event of no outside
job offer. Since the productivity shock arrives every period, this term captures what
happens when the productivity changes. If W (x′, y) > U the relationship is still vi-
able (there is positive surplus), and the worker and firm bargain over the new wage.
If W (x′, y) < U the relationship is no longer viable. The employment partnership
comes to an end. The third term on the right hand side captures exogenous separa-
tion, in which case the worker flows into unemployment and receives U .
The fourth term on the right-hand side corresponds to the worker contacting an
outside firm (and a productivity shock). The worker leaves the current employment
relationship only if the match value of the new match exceeds the value at the cur-
rent firm. The value from the current match and the value at the poaching firm are
compared after the shock to current productivity (demand). In this case, the worker
chooses between two options: unemployment and working at the new firm. In the
latter case, the worker bargains with the outside firm using unemployment as his out-
side option. In the event that the match value at the current firm exceeds both the
value of unemployment and the match value at the outside firm, the worker remains
at the current firm receiving value W (x′, y). If the value of unemployment exceeds
the worker’s value at the current firm and at the outside firm, the worker moves to
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unemployment receiving continuation value U .
2.2.6.2 Value of Filled Job to the Employer
The value of a filled job to the employer satisfies the following equation:
J(x, y) = x · y − w + δ(1− pE)(1− ps)
∫







I{J(x′, y) ≥ J(x0, ỹ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker turns down
poaching firm






The first term on the right-hand side is the flow payoff from a filled job, the out-
put x · y, less the wage paid to the worker for production w. The second term on
the right-hand side corresponds to the event of no outside job offer, no exogenous
separation shock, and a productivity shock. It is completely analogous to the value
of work.
The third term on the right-hand side corresponds to the worker contacting an
outside firm (and a productivity shock). If the worker stays at the current firm, the
expression is the same as if no outside offer was made. If the worker leaves the current
employment relationship, the current firm’s continuation value equals zero.
2.2.6.3 Value of Unemployment
The value of unemployment satisfies:
U = b+ δ(1− pU)U + δpU max{U,U + β[W (x0, y0) + J(x0, y0)− U ]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match consummates or not
(2.3)
where pU is the probability of making a contact with a vacancy for unemployed
workers. The first term captures the flow payoff from unemployment: b. The second
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term corresponds to no job offer, so the worker remains unemployed. The third term
corresponds to a job offer. In this case the worker chooses between working at the
contacting firm and unemployment. The payoff from working at the firm is the outside
option, U , plus β times the surplus.
2.2.7 Solving the Model
The expressions in the previous sections can be summarized in one central func-
tional equation: the surplus from a match, S(x, y). Section 2.9 provides the details
of this derivation. Here I simply present the result:
S(x, y) = x · y + δ (1− pE)︸ ︷︷ ︸
No outside
offer










I{S(x′, y) ≥ S(x0, ỹ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker turns down
poaching firm
max{0, S(x′, y)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match continues or
terminates
+ I{S(x′, y) < S(x0, ỹ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker leaves
current firm
max{0, βS(x0, ỹ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸





− [b+ δpUβmax{0, S(x0, y0)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker’s outside option
(2.4)
The first part of the right hand side is the flow payoff from a match, x ·y. The second
piece captures the event of no outside job offer, no exogenous separation shock and
the continuation surplus of the match. In this case, the match either comes to an
end or the match continues with the new idiosyncratic productivity (demand). The
third piece captures the event of the worker receiving an outside offer and potentially
moving to the poaching firm. When the worker moves to the poaching firm he uses
unemployment as a threat point, and then the current firm has zero continuation
value and the worker’s continuation value is βS(x0, ỹ). The final piece is the outside
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option of an employed worker: he forgoes the value of unemployment, b, and the
possibility of finding a job at a new firm with surplus S(x0, y0) and receiving β of this
surplus. Notice that equation (2.4) is a functional equation in only S(x, y). Value
function iteration yields a close approximation to this function, denoted by Ŝ(x, y).
Assuming a surplus sharing rule for the wage pins down the equilibrium wage equa-
tion as a function of (x, y). The derivation of the surplus and wage equations appear
in Section 2.9. That section also provides details regarding the numerical solution.
2.3 Calibration Strategy
This section highlights the major processes of the model’s state variables and
discusses calibration.
2.3.1 Processes for Idiosyncratic Productivity (x) and Match-Quality (y)
The model period length is one month. Idiosyncratic productivity starts out at a
fixed and deterministic level x0 in all matches, and then within the match follows a
log AR(1) process:
lnx′ = ρx lnx+ ε
′
x (2.5)
where ε′x ∼ N (0, σ2εx). This process captures the intuition that productivity at the
match level, or demand for the match’s output, exhibits some persistence. Match-
quality follows the following distribution:
ln y′ =

ln y0 for jobs out of unemployment (U → E)
ln y if no job change
ε′y if changes jobs (E → E)
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where ε′y ∼ N (0, σ2εy). In other words, match-quality remains constant within a job,
and is log-normally distributed when a worker meets a new firm. In the first job
coming out of unemployment, match-quality is set to y0.
2.3.2 Calibration Methodology
Given the optimal decisions of workers and firms, the model generates simulated
data at a monthly frequency. In particular, I simulate 6,000 agents for 480 months
(40 years). To remove the effects of initial conditions, I simulate the model for 1280
months and then discard the first 800 months of the sample. This simulation provides
a time-path of wages and annual earnings, as well as an employment history. I
compare the earnings of displaced workers in the model-generated data with the
earnings of displaced workers observed in real data.
I calibrate the parameters of the model using simulated method of moments.
Certain key moments summarize the simulated data; among others, these moments
include gross flows between employment and unemployment and the time-path of
earnings for displaced workers. The calibration procedure minimizes the distance
between the summary statistics of the simulated data and the summary statistics of
real data. Specifically, if θ represents the vector of structural parameters, ĝ represents
the moments of the actual data, and g(θ) represents the moments of simulated data
then the simulated minimum distance estimator is defined as:3
θ̂ = arg min
θ
L(θ) = arg min
θ
[g(θ)− ĝ]′W [g(θ)− ĝ] (2.6)
Here g(θ) represents a non-linear transformation of the structural parameters by the
model and a transformation of the simulated data to achieve moments that match
observed moments. Some of the targeted moments are parameters of an auxiliary





model, such as coefficients from an estimated equation using the observed data. In
this sense, the approach here implements a technique called indirect inference.
The optimization is implemented using MATLAB, a commonly used software
package among practitioners, and KNITRO, a state-of-the-art solver, respected in the
optimization community (see, for example, Byrd et al., 1999). Numerical derivatives
are used throughout the implementation, as well as KNITRO’s multi-start feature
(with 500 starting values) which helps avoid local minima.
2.3.3 Calibration
This section presents the key moments of the data and discusses the calibration
strategy. When discussing the identification strategy I describe how changes in pa-
rameters affect moments of the simulated data. Due to the high non-linearity of the
model, no single moment pins down identification of a parameter. Nevertheless elu-
cidating the identification of key components of the model is a worthwhile exercise.
Table 2.1 summarizes the baseline parameters and the moments targeted in the ob-
served data. Table 2.2 displays the simulated moments at the calibrated parameter
values and shows that the model matches well the calibration targets.
The x process represents movements in idiosyncratic productivity and affects the
level and persistence of displacements. The variance of εx is set to match the displace-
ment probability observed in the data in the year following the first displacement.
If x displays no variation (σεx = 0), then the model features exogenous separations
only and there is no serial correlation in displacements, which means that the prob-
ability of displacement in the year following displacement is the same as in all other
years. As the variance of εx rises the probability of separation conditional on any
match-quality level rises. In particular, with initial match-quality coming out of un-
employment fixed to some y0, the separation rate is likely to be higher in the year
following displacement when σεx is higher.
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Conditional on targeting the displacement probability in the year following the
first displacement, ρx targets the persistence in this displacement probability. Fixing
match-quality at some y0 along with time-varying idiosyncratic productivity, delivers
some serial correlation in displacements as individuals low on the job ladder experience
a higher probability of separation than those further up the job ladder. Conditional on
a relatively high x0, higher ρx will serve to mitigate serially correlated displacements
as individuals experience high idiosyncratic productivity for longer. In the calibrated
version of the model, x0 is relatively high so that productivity within the match trends
down over time.4
PSID data provide a way to measure serial correlation in displacements. The
PSID began in 1968 with an interview of 5,000 families, and follows any new families
formed from the original group of families. I follow Polsky (1999) closely with my em-
pirical approach to calculating job switches. Anticipating the E-E transition analysis
later in this chapter, I use the 1976-1997 waves of the PSID study. I drop the years
prior to 1975 because the job history data for these years are poor (Brown and Light,
1992), and I omit the years following 1997 because of the biennial surveys. I include
an individual in the sample if they appeared as a household head for three consec-
utive years from their first year as household head in the survey. In the data, job
displacements are determined from a question that asks respondents with low levels
of current job tenure “What happened to that employer (job)?” (the individual’s pre-
vious job). The two categories of responses used to identify displacements are “plant
closed/employer moved” and “laid off/fired.” Using this data, in the year following
their first displacement, workers’ probability of experiencing another displacement in-
creases by around 25 percentage points. The effect of the first displacement displays
serial correlation with a 0.63 annual persistence parameter.
The starting idiosyncratic productivity for unemployed individuals, x0, is targeted
4This is consistent with Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Hall (1999).
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to generate the employment-to-unemployment (E-U) transition probability found in
the United States gross flows data. As x0 rises, unemployment becomes more appeal-
ing because the first job coming out of unemployment has higher productivity. This
induces a larger fraction of the employed to flow into unemployment every period.
Elsby et al. (2010) find the monthly layoff inflow rate is around 1.5 percent (table
9 in their paper). Since most displacements represent no fault termination or layoff
from employment, using the layoff inflow rate is an appropriate target.
The standard deviation of match-quality is difficult to quantify in the data. The
model provides a convenient way of calibrating this parameter: the on-impact dip
in earnings resulting from displacement. Increasing the dispersion in y implies that
agents on average move further up the job ladder, and have more earnings to lose,
when they experience a displacement. This increases the on-impact dip in earnings
resulting from displacements. As an alternative, in a very similar model to the one
presented here, Low et al. (2010) estimate the standard deviation of match-quality
at 0.22.
As mentioned in the introduction, I target the time-path of displaced worker
earnings in this analysis.5 This shows that there exists a model and a set of parameter
values that delivers something close to the observed earnings experience of displaced
workers. Given the recent article by DV, which highlights the inability of standard
search models to capture this fact, this model’s ability to match this moment is an
accomplishment in and of itself. Section 2.5 provides further implications of this
calibrated model for a range of un-targeted outcomes, including wage dispersion, and
a decomposition of earnings losses into reductions in employment and lost wages.
5In practice I target four points of this time-path: the initial point (six years before displacement),
the point in the year just before displacement, the trough, and the point 20 years after displacement.
The difference between the point in the year just before displacement and the initial point is referred
to as the ‘pre-displacement rise in earnings’ in Table 2.2. The difference between the trough of this
time-path and the point 20 years after displacement is referred to as the ‘recovery of displacement
earnings’ in Table 2.2. Since there are eight calibrated parameters (y0 is a normalization and β is
fixed arbitrarily) and 10 moments, the model is over-identified.
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The observed E-E transition rate is targeted using pE. Raising the number of
contacts employed workers have with outside firms raises the probability that workers
experience E-E switches. Intuitively, this implies that E-E flows in the model are
monotonically increasing in pE. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) use data from the
basic monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) from January 1994 to December
2003. They find that an average of 2.6 percent of employed persons change employers
each month.
The contact probability for the unemployed, pU , is determined by targeting the
aggregate job-finding probability. Increasing the job-contact rate means that unem-
ployed workers experience more frequent contacts and since workers accept all first
offers in this model, the unemployment-to-employment probability rises. Following
Shimer (2005) this analysis targets a monthly job-finding rate of 45 percent.
The exogenous separation rate (ps) targets a slight increase in earnings for high-
tenured workers prior to displacement, as in DV. With only exogenous separations
(ps = 0.015) in the model there would be no movement in average earnings prior to
displacement. Alternatively, if all the displacements in the model were endogenous
(ps = 0) then earnings tend to vary more prior to displacement.
The value of leisure, b, is chosen to target the value found in Hall and Milgrom
(2008): 0.71 of average productivity of labor (APL). Since the emphasis of this work
is not on the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle,
the calibration of this parameter is less crucial. The value found in Hall and Milgrom
(2008) serves as a benchmark.6
The starting match-quality is normalized to the expected value of the stochastic
process for y, which is close to one. At the solution, this means that y0 falls at
around half of the average match-quality among employed workers, which is around
two standard deviations below the mean. The bargaining power of the worker, β, is
6Table 2.2 shows that the model cannot quite hit the Hall and Milgrom (2008) target.
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set to 0.5, realistic adjustments of which I have found to be immaterial. Finally, δ
targets a five percent annual interest rate.
2.4 Results
To compare the simulated and observed data, the simulated monthly wage infor-
mation is aggregated into annual earnings data and the following equation is esti-










where the superscript y denotes the displacement year, the outcome variable eyit is
annual earnings of individual i in year t, αy represents a constant, Dkit are dummy
variables equal to one in the worker’s kth year before or after his displacement and
zero otherwise, and the error uyit represents random factors. Note that k = 1 denotes
the displacement year and k = 0 denotes the final year of positive earnings from the
pre-displacement employer. The model of this chapter does not feature individual or
time variation that needs to be controlled by using individual or time fixed effects.
DV estimate this distributed lag model separately for each displacement year y. In
the model presented in this chapter all years are identical, so y is fixed at an arbitrary
year.
As in DV, the sample is restricted to individuals with at least three years of tenure
at the time of displacement. In particular, the worker must have positive earnings
from the employer in question in y− 3, y− 2, and y− 1. This could mean as little as
14 months of tenure at the time of displacement. Furthermore, a worker “separates”
from an employer in year y when he has earnings from the employer in y−1 but not in
y and, in the simulated data, the worker experiences a separation into unemployment
in year y − 1. Conditioning on job loss is important because a worker may not have
22
earnings from his previous employer in year y because of an E-E transition. These
workers are not included in the treatment or the control groups. This resembles the
treatment group used by DV as they omit so-called non-mass-layoff separators from
the control group. I cannot impose the same “mass layoff” definition as DV because
the model features one-worker firms.
For year y, the treatment group includes those workers displaced in year y, y + 1
and y+2. Including workers from three years serves to smooth the estimated earnings
effects of job displacement from year to year. The control group includes individuals
with the same tenure requirement who do not experience a displacement in year y,
y+ 1, and y+ 2. For the control group, Dkit = 0 for all t so that the dummy variables
reflect the change in earnings relative to this control group. The tenure restriction
implies that most individuals in the treatment group separate from their employer
via an exogenous separation. Nonetheless, endogenous separations play a key role in
explaining serial correlation in displacements.
Figure 2.1 presents a comparison between the results from the baseline model
and the results from DV. The results are very encouraging, with the baseline model
delivering an earnings trajectory that closely resembles the empirical counterpart.
The search model outlined in this chapter can account for the time-path of displaced
worker earnings.
On impact the model predicts the losses in annual earnings well: around 30 per-
cent. Additionally, the model captures the movements in earnings post-displacement
very well. For the first 10-15 years of the recovery the model provides a remarkable
fit. The model cannot deliver the plateauing, and even declining, earnings time-path
after 15 years observed in the data. The framework features ex-ante homogeneous
agents and a steady state wage distribution, which imply that eventually the earn-
ings of displaced workers will recover. Nevertheless, after 20 years the model implies
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earnings losses similar to those found in the data.7
Loss in match-quality results in the on-impact dip in earnings, as workers fall from
higher rungs of the job ladder, to a low job rung in their first job out of unemployment.
Earnings fall slightly in the year following displacement because some workers lose
their jobs late in the ‘0’ year and so have a substantial amount of earnings in the year
of job loss. Since it takes unemployed workers time to find jobs, and y0 < E[y|match]
so that first jobs pay very little, in the year immediately following job loss workers
may actually experience a small dip in earnings. This additional loss in earnings is
also attributable to using observations from years y, y + 1 and y + 2, which serves to
smooth out the effects of displacement. In addition to these timing issues, the high
serial correlation in displacements implies that in the year following the investigated
displacement, the worker may experience subsequent displacements that reduce his
annual earnings even further.
The slow recovery in earnings represents the slow move up the job ladder for
recently displaced workers, which in turn manifests serially correlated displacements.
Agents experience serially correlated displacements because match-quality remains
low in first jobs and therefore only small movements in idiosyncratic productivity
cause further displacements.
Figure 2.2 compares the percentage-point change in the displacement probability
(from the average displacement probability) for the model and the PSID after the
first displacement.8 The line implied by the model incorporates the PSID survey
algorithm. In other words, I look at individuals every 12 months and, if their tenure
7The time-path of earnings from the simulated data is not smooth due to the limited number
of agents. Adding more agents to the simulation would smooth out this time-series. Also, Davis
and von Wachter (2011) do not present results that do not distinguish between expansions and
recessions so a direct comparison to the model is not possible. Since times of expansion are much
more prevalent than times of recession, most displacements occur during times of expansion. Thus,
I suspect that results averaged over expansions and recessions would appear close to the ‘expansion’
estimates.
8The figures only document probabilities up to 10 years following displacement due to small
sample sizes beyond this horizon in the PSID.
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is less than 12 months, and their most recent job ended in an unemployment spell,
I classify them as displaced. I divide the number of displacements every year by the
number of employed individuals last year to obtain the model implied displacement
probability.
The model endogenously generates serial correlation in displacements that quan-
titatively matches the evidence from the PSID. The parameters σεx and ρx are chosen
to match the initial spike in displacement probability (around 25 percentage points
above the average displacement probability) and the persistence of this process respec-
tively. The model delivers the initial spike in displacement probability, and delivers
slightly more persistence in displacements than we observe in the data, with the first
displacement effect not quite subsiding after 10 years.
2.5 External Validity
Now that I have established that the calibrated model presented in this chapter
reproduces the earnings time-path of displaced workers, this section describes the fit
of the model in un-targeted dimensions, including wage related moments, decompo-
sition of earnings losses into reduced wages and employment, flow probabilities, and
movements in total factor productivity (TFP).
2.5.1 Wage Related Moments
The model generates other interesting moments that can help to assess the va-
lidity of the theory described in this chapter. Table 2.3 compares some wage-related
moments in the simulated data and the observed data. As an example, the simu-
lated data imply a standard deviation of annual quarterly earnings changes within
matches of 16 percent. Topel and Ward (1992) use Longitudinal Employee-Employer
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Data data to estimate the same moment for young workers aged 18 to 34.9 They
obtain a value of 19 percent, which signals relatively large movements in earnings
within matches, and the model is able to match these fluctuations. The idiosyncratic
productivity process is largely responsible for these large fluctuations of wages within
matches (high σεx).
10
Another important non-targeted moment is the mean-min wage ratio, which cap-
tures the amount of equilibrium wage dispersion. In recent important work, Horn-
stein et al. (2011) show that standard MP models cannot reproduce observed wage
dispersion. In their working paper, they use data from the Census, Occupational
Employment Survey and PSID to document mean-min wage ratios between 1.5 and
2. They document that standard search models generate mean-min wage ratios much
closer to one. They suggest that models with on-the-job search can attain mean-min
wage ratios that are more consistent with observed data. The baseline model implies
a mean-min wage ratio of 1.9, which lies in the range of estimated values. This is quite
an achievement and goes a long way towards explaining why the model presented in
this chapter can account for all the earnings losses associated with displacement. It
seems that generating realistic wage dispersion can help explain the persistence of
earnings losses experienced by displaced workers. Put another way, it seems that
the “bad luck” associated with losing one’s job can explain the entirety of the poor
recovery in post-displacement earnings observed in the data. In their paper, DV do
not report the mean-min wage ratio for their calibrated BT model. A comparable
statistic is the max-min wage ratio. In the calibrated model of this chapter, the
maximum wage exceeds the minimum wage by around 400%, which compares to only
49% in the Burgess-Turon model presented in DV. These observations suggest that
9Since the model is an infinite horizon model, young workers are the more relevant empirical
counterpart.
10The model undershoots the quarterly wage growth from E-E transitions. The idiosyncratic
process is difficult to identify. In calibrations with similar objective function values the model can
undershoot the standard deviation of annual quarterly earnings changes within matches and obtain
the quarterly wage growth from E-E transitions.
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the model features a significant job ladder that matches empirical facts well.
The model also speaks to the decomposition of earnings losses into wages and
employment. Topel (1990) uses the PSID to find that “two-thirds of the initial loss in
annual earnings for the typical worker is caused by unemployment” and “virtually all
of the short-run recovery of annual earnings...is due to an increase in weeks worked
between the first and second year of postdisplacement experience.” In the long-run,
Topel (1990) finds that “three-fourths of [the post-displacement earning loss] is due to
lower wages...” Bender et al. (2009) corroborate these results with a study of German
displaced workers. They also find that reduced employment explains a substantial
part of the initial loss in earnings. They find that after about 10 years the effect
of displacement on employment dissipates, and reduced wages are responsible for all
subsequent earnings losses. One can estimate equation (2.7), with three left-hand-
side variables: earnings, wages and employment. Figure 2.3 presents the model’s
decomposition of earnings losses into lost wages and unemployment.
The model suggests that around 80 percent of the initial loss in annual earnings is
accounted for by lost employment and 20 percent by reduced wages. This resembles
the data’s values: 66 percent and 33 percent respectively. As in the data, the model
predicts that in the short run the earnings recovery is almost solely due to increased
employment. Consistent with the empirical work, in the long run the model predicts
that around three quarters of earnings losses are due to lower wages and around one
quarter due to reduced employment. Given that this break down was not targeted, it
is remarkable that the model’s decomposition resembles the decomposition we observe
in the data. This result finds its roots in the serial correlation in displacements
exhibited by the model. With high persistence in displacements, reduced employment
lingers for many years.
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2.5.2 Non-Wage Related Moments
The calibrated model also speaks to non-wage related moments. As an example,
Foster et al. (2008) use the Census of Manufacturers to estimate the annual persistence
in establishment-level productivity to be 0.75 to 0.8. They estimate the following
regression with TFP on the left hand side instead of x · y, and I estimate the same
equation via OLS using the simulated data:11
xt+1 · yt+1 = β0 + β1xt · yt + ξt+1 (2.8)
where x · y represents TFP in the baseline model. In this calibrated version of the
model, β̂1 turns out to be around around 0.65, very close to the range of values found
by Foster et al. (2008), 0.75 to 0.8. This is largely due to the fixed match-quality on
the job as well as the persistence of the calibrated idiosyncratic productivity process.
Foster et al. (2008) also estimate the standard deviation for plant level productivity
(in logs) to be between 0.21 and 0.26 (table 1 of their paper), which implies that plant-
level productivities fall within 50 percent of the average plant productivity. Again, the
model does a nice job of capturing this aspect of the data with an estimated standard
deviation of plant level productivity at 0.29, a little higher than in the data.12
The model also speaks to E-E flows around the time of displacement, suggesting
increased E-E flows after displacement as workers climb the job ladder in search for a
better suited job. I use data from the PSID to verify these predictions of the model.
If the individual is employed at time period t and employed at time period t+ 1 and
the tenure in the current employer is less than or equal to 12 months, and the person
reports no spell of unemployment last year, a job switch is assumed to have occurred
at time t+1.13 Even though the model makes no distinction between promotions and
11The results are virtually identical if the regression is specified in logs.
12The model takes a very micro view of the firm treating each worker as a plant.
13Tenure information is notoriously noisy in the PSID. I use the approach of Altonji and Shakotko
(1987) to clean the tenure variable.
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E-E switches, promotions are not included as a form of job switching in the empirical
approach because the model was calibrated to target the average E-E rate, which
does not include promotions at the same employer. To obtain a probability, I divide
the number of job switches by the number of individuals employed in the previous
year.
Figure 2.4 shows that, on average, workers in the PSID exhibit elevated E-E
rates for around 10 years after their first displacement. In the same figure I plot the
percentage-point change in the E-E probability (from the average E-E probability) for
the simulated data. In the simulated data I implement the PSID survey algorithm.
In other words, I look at individuals every 12 months, and note their employment
status. If the individuals are employed this year, employed last year, have tenure
less than 12 months and experience no unemployment in the last 12 months, they
are marked as E-E switchers. I divide the number of E-E switches by the number
of employed individuals in the previous year to obtain a number that is compara-
ble to the PSID calculation. Although the magnitude is slightly higher, the model
does match the qualitative shape of the E-E probability after the first displacement,
remaining elevated for 10 years after the first displacement. This calibrated model
faces a tension between a low y0 that helps match the dip in earnings in the year of
displacement, and a higher y0 that would reduce the number of E-E switches among
the recently employed.
2.6 Robustness Checks
The model presented in this chapter includes a variety of components. This section
demonstrates the importance of each feature. The model presented here has both
idiosyncratic productivity and match-quality. Dropping these elements prevents the
model from explaining the data. Figure 2.5 presents the δk coefficients from equation
(2.7) (normalized by pre-displacement earnings) from alternative versions of the model
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in separate graphs, together with the baseline model. The alternate models are
calibrated in a comparable fashion to the baseline.14
The top-left graph presents a standard Mortensen-Pissarides style model, like the
one in DV. The coefficients before displacement are zero because the model features
exogenous separations so prior to displacement all workers have the same earnings.
In the year of displacement, earnings fall, and they quickly recover within two years
because of the high job-finding rate. Since all workers earn the same wage in this
model, the mean-min wage ratio is exactly equal to one.
The top-right graph takes the standard MP model and adds idiosyncratic produc-
tivity that follows an AR(1) process. To remain as close as possible to the baseline
model, this simplified framework features endogenous and exogenous separations. I
fix the initial x to a fixed, deterministic x0. This model features no job ladder and ex-
hibits quick earnings recovery post-displacement despite the presence of idiosyncratic
productivity. This is because in the calibration ps ≈ 0.015 and the so the model
behaves like the standard MP model, with a mean-min wage ratio slightly larger than
one.
The bottom-left graph features a job ladder and exogenous separations, with no
idiosyncratic productivity. This model features no serial correlation in displacements
because the flow hazard into unemployment is constant and exogenous. This calibra-
tion misses the data on displaced workers and predicts a full recovery after about 15
years. This model features increasing earnings prior to displacement as workers climb
up the ladder and experience exogenous separations. Nevertheless, this does show
that a model with match-quality goes a long way towards explaining the persistence
in earnings losses of displaced workers. The mean-min wage ratio for this model is
around 1.2. Adding persistent idiosyncratic productivity obtains the ‘Baseline Model’
14Details of calibration for each model are available upon request. Aside from the basic MP model,
all calibrations target the earnings time-path around displacement. All calibrations target the U-E,
E-U and (where applicable) E-E rates, and 0.71 × APL for the value of leisure.
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line in the bottom-right graph, which features all the quantitative characteristics of
the data. The line implied by the baseline model captures the empirical work well
and supports the choice of model; other simpler models of a similar flavor simply
cannot explain all the data. As mentioned before, this model delivers realistic wage
dispersion with a mean-min wage ratio equal to 1.9. This underscores the impor-
tance of replicating the observed level of wage dispersion when matching the earnings
losses of displaced workers in the context of stationary search models with ex-ante
homogeneous workers.
The details of an efficient wage model are discussed in Section 2.8. The result of
this model appears in the bottom-right graph, and matches closely the results from
the baseline model. For simplicity, this chapter demonstrates results using the simple
surplus sharing solution.
2.7 Summary and Discussion
Previous literature documents large and persistent earnings losses associated with
worker displacement. I propose a rich search and matching model to help under-
stand the time-path of earnings for displaced workers. Persistence in idiosyncratic
productivity (demand) helps explain the movement in earnings prior to separation.
Match-quality in the form of a job ladder, in conjunction with low match-quality in
first jobs, helps explain post-displacement earnings losses via serially correlated dis-
placements and increased time to “ideal” job. The model performs remarkably well in
explaining the post-displacement recovery in earnings and the long-run earnings losses
experienced by displaced workers. Importantly, the model has a stationary structure,
so that the prolonged earnings losses generated are an outcome of “bad luck.” In con-
junction with serially correlated displacements, matching the observed wage disper-
sion seems like an important element of any search model targeting displaced worker
earnings losses. Many alternative models, including the basic MP model and even
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models with a job ladder, but no idiosyncratic productivity and serially correlated
displacements, cannot deliver the observed earnings losses of displaced workers. The
model presented here also speaks to additional un-targeted moments. It successfully
matches the decomposition of earnings losses into reduced wages and employment,
as well as fluctuations in TFP and earnings within matches. The model correctly
predicts increased E-E transitions after displacement as workers more readily switch
jobs when low on the job ladder.
As mentioned briefly in Section 2.4, the targeted moments imply that most indi-
viduals in the treatment group separate from their employer via an exogenous separa-
tion. This is a result of the tenure restriction. Although in any given year, endogenous
separations account for most of the E-U flows, individuals with three years of tenure
do not experience endogenous separations and therefore displacement is an event ex-
ogenous to the model outlined here. This raises an important question for future
research to address: are displacements in fact exogenous? This topic touches upon
a long-standing issue of whether separations are efficient; whether there exists a dis-
tinction between quits and layoffs.15 Endogenizing the separation of well-matched
individuals seems like a promising avenue for future research. In particular, an in-
ability to borrow in tight credit markets may serve to explain why firms do not hold
onto highly productive workers when experiencing reduced demand for their product.
This approach could provide a reason for inefficient separations and could help us
better understand the experience of displaced workers.
15See, for example, Hall (2005).
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2.8 Appendix A: Model with Rigid Wages
This section outlines an alternative model that features efficient rigid wages, as
opposed to a surplus sharing rule, as well as the ability for workers to use their
current and outside offers in bargaining over their new wage with an outside or current
firm, respectively. The time-path of earnings around displacement implied by this
alternative model resembles the time-path of earnings in the baseline model, and so
the main text develops the surplus sharing model, which is standard in the search
and matching literature.
The alternative bargaining solution results in an efficient rigid wage. I follow the
approach of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), Malcomson (1999) and more recently
Yamaguchi (2010). When the worker and the firm first meet, they (Nash) bargain
over an employment contract given all relevant information such as skills and match-
quality. Once they sign the contract, the firm pays a fixed flow wage w and the
worker supplies a flow of labor services until a possible renegotiation or separation.
At this point the two parties renegotiate the wage up/down if the worker/employer can
credibly threaten to leave the employment relationship. The model therefore exhibits
bargaining with unemployed workers, bilateral bargaining with employed workers
when productivity fluctuations induce wage renegotiation, and trilateral bargaining
with employed workers when workers encounter outside job offers. The solution to
the trilateral bargaining problem comes from Cahuc et al. (2006) who show that the
worker’s threat point is the match value with the losing firm. The model still features
privately efficient separations.
2.8.1 Intuition
Before I discuss the formal model equations, I want to provide a simple description
of the model dynamics and give the reader intuition for the mechanics of the model.
The model delivers two features: a fall in earnings prior to displacement (when not
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relative to a control group) and a slow recovery in earnings post-displacement. Per-
sistence in the idiosyncratic process implies that the average displaced worker in the
model experiences a reduction in earnings prior to separation. This follows because
conditional on being displaced, the match is more likely to have experienced a neg-
ative shock in the period prior to displacement and so the idiosyncratic component
will be closer to the firing threshold than in previous periods. The model delivers
a slow recovery in earnings post-displacement for three reasons. First, immediately
post-displacement, the calibrated model suggests that workers take jobs with lower
match-qualities, compared to their pre-displacement jobs and the average match-
quality among employed workers. Second, in conjunction with a low match quality
among first jobs, the job ladder effect introduces persistence in earnings; it takes time
for employed workers to find good quality matches. Third, low post-displacement
match-qualities mean that newly created jobs are likely close to the job destruction
threshold. This makes it more likely that these matches will be destroyed, resulting
in multiple displacements and serial unemployment. This serial unemployment ef-
fect dovetails with work by Stevens (1997) who finds that multiple job losses are an
important explanation for the persistence of earnings losses.
2.8.1.1 Wage Dynamics Prior to Displacement
Figure 2.6 displays the model intuition graphically. At time t = −7 we encounter
an established employment relationship with some (x, y) and x < x0. At time t = −6,
x goes up. This causes the reservation wage of the current firm to move up and the
reservation wage of the worker to move down slightly. The firm is willing to pay
more because the output of the match has increased. The worker is willing to receive
less because the chance of a separation relates inversely to x.16 Nonetheless, the
16The worker’s reservation wage is defined as W (x, y, wR) = U . Since W turns out to be increasing
in w and x, an increase in x causes a reduction in wR. Analogously, the firm’s reservation wage is
defined as J(x, y, wfR) = 0. Since J turns out to be decreasing in w and increasing in x, an increase
in x causes an increase in wfR.
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actual wage does not change because neither party can credibly threaten to leave the
employment relationship and thus the current wage contract persists. At time t = −5
the worker receives an outside offer, and his reservation wage rises. There exists no
mutually agreeable wage at the current firm so the worker leaves the current firm. At
the new firm the match-quality is higher (y1), the idiosyncratic productivity starts
out at x0. Based on the new x and y, as well as the worker’s previous employment
relationship, a generalized Nash bargain results in a new wage. At time t = −4
the worker receives another outside offer. His reservation wage does not exceed the
reservation wage of the firm, so the current firm keeps the worker. However, the wage
at the current employment relationship is bid up because the worker can credibly
threaten to leave to the poaching firm. At the new contracted wage, the worker is
indifferent between staying at the current firm and leaving to the poaching firm.
At time t = −3, x moves up, but causes no change in the wage, as during t =
−6. At time t = −2 the idiosyncratic component moves down, causing a downward
movement in the reservation wage of the firm. Since there is still positive surplus
from the employment relationship the wage is renegotiated downwards so that the
firm is indifferent between keeping the worker and letting him go. At time t = −1 the
idiosyncratic component falls again, and the wage is renegotiated further downwards.
At time t = 0 the idiosyncratic component falls below x∗(y1) the cutoff associated with
match-quality y1.
17 There exists no wage above the reservation wage of the worker and
below the reservation wage of the firm. The match dissolves and the worker becomes
unemployed. Notice that prior to displacement, the model will, on average, predict a
fall in x, and since earnings are a positive function of this component, earnings will
tend to fall before displacement. This is without comparing to a control group and
without conditioning on three years of tenure. The graphical pictures do not suffice
to provide intuition for this more complicated case.
17Formally, x∗(y) satisfies S(x∗(y), y) = 0 for any y.
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I relate these movements in x to demand for the match’s output. When demand
for the match’s output wanes sufficiently, the firm can credibly threaten to lay the
worker off because the firm’s share of the surplus becomes less than the value of
posting a new vacancy. Since the worker still prefers to remain in the match, wage
renegotiation results in a lower wage. As the demand for the match’s output continues
to fall, the bargained wage continues to fall. Sufficiently large downward movements
in demand exhaust the match surplus and the employment relationship terminates.
Intuitively, this suggests that as demand for the match’s output falls, the firm pulls
back on wages, resulting in worker earnings losses prior to displacement. As demand
continues to fall, eventually the employment relationship terminates.
2.8.1.2 Wage Dynamics Post-Displacement
Figure 2.7 presents the model intuition post-displacement with a focus on serial
unemployment. After a couple of periods the worker finds a new job with idiosyncratic
component x0. By assumption this job will have a lower match-quality (y0) than the
average job that the worker climbed to before separation (y1). Since surplus is a
positive function of x and y, and y is lower, x must be higher to maintain positive
surplus. This is why x∗(y0) > x
∗(y1). Since the post-displacement x is closer to the
threshold, the idiosyncratic component is more likely to go under the cutoff again.
In other words, the worker is likely to experience multiple spells of unemployment.
This is consistent with work by Stevens (1997). In this particular figure, at time
t = 3, the match experiences a downward movement in x that results in a subsequent
separation. Serial unemployment partially explains the slow recovery of earnings after
displacement. Moreover, even if the worker does not get displaced subsequently, it




This section details the Bellman equations characterizing the efficient rigid wage
model.
2.8.2.1 Joint Value of a Match
Define the continuation value of employed workers and firms as W (x, y, w) and
J(x, y, w) respectively. Let U be the continuation value of unemployed workers. Free
entry into vacancies implies that the firm’s value of a vacancy is zero. For notational
convenience, define the joint value as the sum of the value of a match to the worker
and the firm:
V (x, y) = W (x, y, w) + J(x, y, w)
Notice that w does not change the joint value of a match V ; it merely determines
the allocation of the joint value between worker and firm. A higher w implies that
the worker receives more of the match value. The joint value function satisfies:













max{U, V (x′, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match
continues





where pE is the probability of contacting an outside firm, δ stands for the discount
factor and β represents the bargaining power of the worker. The flow payoff from the
match equals x · y, the product of productivity and match-quality. Every period a
shock to productivity arrives. In the event of no outside job offer (occurs with proba-
bility 1− pE), the employment relationship either continues with joint value V (x′, y),
or a separation occurs. In the event of separation, the worker receives continuation
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value U and the firm is left with nothing (remember that the value of a vacancy is
zero in equilibrium), which makes the joint continuation value U . Notice that the
V (x′, y) term captures renegotiation: the employment relationship continues, but a
new wage, w′, divides the surplus differently.
When a productivity shock occurs and the worker contacts an outside firm, three
things can happen. First, the outside offer could be worse than the current match, and
the productivity shock makes the current match unbearable. This causes a separation
that leaves the worker with U and the firm with zero. Second, the current employment
relationship continues with V (x′, y). This includes the case of a newly renegotiated
wage at the current firm because changing the wage contract does not change the
match value. Third, the outside offer induces renegotiation and the worker leaves the
current firm (V (x0, ỹ) exceeds V (x
′, y)). The continuation value here looks like the
outcome of generalized Nash bargaining with the new employer using the value of the
old relationship (or unemployment, whichever is larger) as a threat point. This result
comes from Appendix A of Cahuc et al. (2006).
2.8.2.2 Value of Work to the Employee
The value of work satisfies the following equation:
W (x, y, w) = w + δ(1− ps)(1− pE)
∫
max{U,min{V (x′, y),W (x′, y, w)}}︸ ︷︷ ︸






I{V (x0, ỹ) > V (x′, y)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker leaves current firm
max{U, (1− β) max{V (x′, y), U}+ βV (x0, ỹ)}
+ I{V (x0, ỹ) ≤ V (x′, y)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker turns down outside firm
max{U,min{V (x′, y),W (x′, y, w)}, V (x0, ỹ)}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ)
(2.10)
The value of work is a function of three state variables: the idiosyncratic productivity
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x, the match-quality y, and the previous wage w. The first term on the right-hand
side is the flow payoff from working, which is the current wage: w. Note that I assume
a linear utility function (risk-neutrality).
The second term on the right-hand side corresponds to the event of no outside job
offer. Since I assume the productivity shock arrives every period, I need to consider
what happens when the productivity changes. The are several possibilities. First, if
W (x′, y, w) > V (x′, y) ≥ U the relationship is still viable (there is positive surplus),
but the firm can credibly threaten to leave. In this case, the wage is reduced until
W (x′, y, w′) = V (x′, y), i.e., J(x′, y, w′) = 0 so that the firm is indifferent between
separation and continuation. Second, if V (x′, y) ≥ U > W (x′, y, w) the relationship
is still viable, but the worker can credibly threaten to leave. In this case the wage
rises until the worker is indifferent between unemployment and working at the current
firm: W (x′, y, w′) = U . Third, if V (x′, y) < U the relationship is no longer viable.
The employment partnership comes to an end. Finally, if anything else happens the
employment relationship continues with continuation value W (x′, y, w).
The third term on the right-hand side corresponds to the worker contacting an
outside firm (and a productivity shock). The worker leaves the current employment
relationship only if the match value of the new match exceeds the value at the current
firm. The function I{V (x0, ỹ) > V (x′, y)} captures this outcome. The timing here
is important: the value from the current match and the value at the poaching firm
are compared after the shock to current productivity (demand) arrives. In this case,
the worker chooses between two options: unemployment and working at the new
firm. In the latter case, the worker bargains with the outside firm after renegotiating
with his current firm. The worker’s continuation value is “Outside Option + β ×
Match Surplus”. In this case the outside option is either V (x′, y) or U . The latter
occurs when the productivity shock induces a separation. If no separation occurs, the
current firm is willing to raise the wage until it is indifferent between separation and
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continuation, and hence the outside option for the worker is V (x′, y).
The function I{V (x0, ỹ) ≤ V (x′, y)} captures the situation where the worker does
not go to the outside firm. There are several cases here. First, if U > V (x′, y)
the relationship is no longer viable. The employment partnership comes to an end.
Second, if V (x0, ỹ) > max{W (x′, y, w), U} the worker can use the outside offer to raise
the wage at the current firm. Third, if V (x′, y) ≥ U > max{V (x0, ỹ),W (x′, y, w)} the
current match still has positive surplus but worker can credibly threaten to leave. The
wage is bid up so that worker is indifferent between staying at current firm and flowing
into unemployment. Fourth, if W (x′, y, w) > V (x′, y) ≥ U then there is positive
surplus but the firm can credibly threaten to leave. In this case, the wage is bid down
so that the firm is indifferent between staying and going. The continuation value
in this case is V (x′, y). If anything else happens, then the employment relationship
continues with continuation value W (x′, y, w).
Given the previous definitions, the value of a filled job to the firm is simply:
J(x, y, w) = V (x, y)−W (x, y, w) (2.11)
2.8.2.3 Value of Unemployment
The value of unemployment satisfies:
U = b+ δ(1− pU)U + δpU max{U,U + β[V (x0, y0)− U ]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match consummates or not
(2.12)
where p is the probability of making a contact with a vacancy for unemployed workers.
The first term captures the flow payoff from unemployment: b. The second term cor-
responds to no outside job offer. In this case the worker simply remains unemployed.
The third term corresponds to an outside job offer. In this case the worker chooses
between working at the contacting firm and unemployment. The payoff from working
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at the firm is the outside option, U , plus β times the surplus, which is [V (x0, y0)−U ].
Again, this is proved formally in Cahuc et al. (2006). In particular, this generalized
Nash outcome is the result of an infinitely repeated game where worker and firm make
alternating wage offers. Note that V (x0, y0)− U = W (x0, y0, w′), where w′ is chosen
so that this is true.
2.8.3 Solving the Model
I derive one central functional equation in the surplus from a match, S(x, y). The
derivation is similar to the baseline model, and I present the equation here:










max{0, S(x′, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match
continues
,max{0, S(x′, y)} + β[S(x0, ỹ)−max{0, S(x
′




− [b + δpUβmax{0, S(x0, y0)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker’s outside option
(2.13)
The first part of the right hand side is the flow payoff from a match, x · y. The
second piece captures the event of no outside job offer and the continuation value
of the match. In this case, the match either comes to an end or the match contin-
ues with the new idiosyncratic productivity (demand). The third piece captures the
event of the worker receiving an outside offer and potentially moving to the poaching
firm. When the worker moves to the poaching firm he uses the surplus at his previous
firm (or zero if his old relationship implies negative surplus at the new idiosyncratic
level) as a threat point. The final piece is the outside option of an employed worker:
he forgoes the value of unemployment, b, and the possibility of finding a job at a
new firm with surplus S(x0, y0) and receiving β of this surplus. Notice that equation
(2.13) is a functional equation in only S(x, y). Value function iteration yields a close
approximation to this function, denoted by Ŝ(x, y).
Calibration and identification follow the baseline model and I omit them here.
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2.9 Appendix B: Surplus/Wage Equation and Numerical De-
tails
This section details the derivation of the surplus equation and the wage equation
used in the main text, as well as briefly describing the numerical approach.
2.9.1 The Surplus Equation
Here I outline how to solve for the the surplus equation. I derive one central
functional equation in the surplus from a match: S(x, y) = W (x, y) + J(x, y) − U .
First, re-arrange equation (2.1) slightly to yield the equivalent expression:
W (x, y) = w + δ(1− pE)(1− ps)
∫
max{U,W (x′, y)}dFx(x′|x) + δpsU
+ δpE(1− ps)
∫ ∫ [
I{W (x′, y) ≥W (x0, ỹ)}max{U,W (x′, y)}





Now simply combine equations (2.14), (2.2) and (2.3) to write:
J(x, y) +W (x, y)− U = S(x, y)
= x · y − w + δ(1− pE)(1− ps)
∫ [




+ δ(1− pE)(1− ps)U + δpsU
+ δpE(1− ps)
∫ ∫ [
I{S(x′, y) ≥ S(x0, ỹ)}
[
max{0, (1− β)S(x′, y)}+ max{0, βS(x′, y)}
]




+ δpE(1− ps)U − δ(1− pU )U − δpU max{0, βS(x0, y0)} − δpUU





I{S(x′, y) ≥ S(x0, ỹ)}max{0, S(x′, y)}






where like terms have been combined and Nash bargaining has been used to sub-
stitute J(x, y) = (1− β)S(x, y) and W (x, y)−U = βS(x, y). Using equation (2.3) to
solve for (1− δ)U , and plugging into this equation yields the desired result.
Value function iteration yields Ŝ(x, y). Once I have Ŝ(x, y) I also have Û because
U can be written as a function of S(x, y). With Ŝ(x, y) and Û I can simulate the
economy and observe workers moving between employment and unemployment and
from job to job.
2.9.2 The Wage Equation
Start with equation (2.1) and subtract and add U under the integrals to obtain:
W (x, y) = w + δ(1− pE)(1− ps)
∫
max{0,W (x′, y)− U}dFx(x′|x) + δ(1− pE)(1− ps)U
+ δpE(1− ps)
∫ ∫
max{0,W (x′, y)− U,W (x0, ỹ)− U}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ) + δpE(1− ps)U
+ δpsU
Simplifying the terms with U , subtracting U from both sides and using the fact
that the Nash bargain implies that W (x, y)− U = βS(x, y) yields:
βS(x, y) = w + δ(1− pE)(1− ps)
∫
max{0, βS(x′, y)}dFx(x′|x)− (1− δ)U
+ δpE(1− ps)
∫ ∫
max{0, βS(x′, y), βS(x0, ỹ)}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ)
∴ w(x, y) = βS(x, y) + [b+ δpUβmax{0, S(x0, y0)}]





max{0, S(x′, y), S(x0, ỹ)}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ)
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2.9.3 Numerical Details
I solve the model numerically using a contraction mapping in a discretized state
space. I discretize the AR(1) process for idiosyncratic productivity (x) onto 49
grid points using the Rouwenhorst method. This method is most often attributed
to Rouwenhorst (1995) and in a recent article, Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010)
have shown that this discretization method outperforms the approaches described in
Tauchen (1986) and Tauchen and Hussey (1991). In particular, for persistent AR(1)
processes, as turns out to be the case here, the Tauchen (1986) method requires a
large number of grid points to produce close approximations, which causes increased
computational time. Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010) show that the Rouwenhorst
method provides a close approximation “robust to the number of discrete values for
a wide range of the parameter space.” Finally, the match-quality process has 49 grid
points and I also use the Rouwenhorst method for discretizing this state variable. I
solve the value function on a grid, and in the simulation interpolate for points off the
gird using linear interpolation. I do not allow state variables to take values above and
below the respective minimum and maximum values on the gird, although in prac-
tice this does not affect the results because the probability of state variables falling
outside the grid remains extremely small.
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Figure 2.1: Annual Earnings Losses: Model vs. Data
Note: The estimated coefficients δk from equation (2.7). Includes the results from DV and the results from the
model. The earnings losses are relative to a non-displaced control group with the same three year tenure
requirement as the displaced treatment group. Earnings losses are plotted as a fraction of average pre-displacement
earnings of the treatment group in the four years prior to displacement. For a definition of displacement and the
tenure requirement see the text.
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Figure 2.2: Level Increase in Annual Displacement Probability over Average Displace-
ment Probability: Model vs. PSID
Note: For PSID, by year since first displacement, take the number of individuals reporting a displacement and
divide by the number of employed individuals in the previous year. Perform precisely the same calculation with the
simulated data. This includes replicating the PSID survey and classifying someone as displaced if they have less
than one year of tenure at the time of the interview, and their most recent job ended in a displacement. In the first
year after displacement there are around 850 displacements in the PSID. This number falls to around 100 after 10
years. The average displacement probability during this period in the PSID is around nine percent, which is
significantly higher than results from Davis and von Wachter (2011) (around 3.5 percent annual displacement
probability). This is not surprising. Davis and von Wachter (2011) focus on male employees 50 years or younger
with at least three years of prior job tenure. My analysis makes no such restrictions. The implied annual layoff
probability using the monthly probability of 1.5 percent is around 16 percent. This is more in line with the number
from the PSID, but the annual PSID survey misses short spells of employment between surveys and makes recall
bias more pronounced, which are likely to bias the displacement probability downwards.
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Figure 2.3: Decomposition: Employment and Wages
Note: The earnings time-path is the same as in Figure 2.1. Since workers do not have a valid wage when they are
unemployed, this analysis uses the average non-zero monthly wage in a year to measure the annual wage. The
average annual probability of employment is used to measure annual employment.
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Figure 2.4: Level Increase in Annual E-E Probability over Average E-E Probability:
Model vs. PSID
Note: This is relative to the first displacement. The annual E-E probability is calculated as the number of
individuals who are employed this year, employed last year, report tenure of less than one year, and report no time
unemployed, divided by the number of employed individuals in the previous year. The average E-E probability is
simply the average of the E-E probabilities over all the sample years. In the first year after displacement there are
around 350 E-E transitions in the PSID. This number falls to around 70 after 10 years. The average E-E probability
during this period in the PSID is around eight percent, which is significantly lower than results from Fallick and
Fleischman (2004) (around 27 percent annual E-E probability). The annual PSID survey misses short spells of
employment between surveys and makes recall bias more pronounced.
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Figure 2.5: Annual Earnings Losses: Alternative Models
Note: The estimated coefficients δk from equation (2.7) for alternative models. See the text for a description of each
of the models.
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Figure 2.6: Model Intuition: Pre-Displacement
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Figure 2.7: Model Intuition: Post-Displacement
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Table 2.1: Calibrated Model Parameters
Parameter (θ) Meaning Calibrated Value (θ̂) Main Source of Identification
ρx Productivity persistence 0.43 Persistence of displacements
σεx Std. dev. of productivity 0.24 Post-disp. increase in disp. prob.
σεy Std. dev. of match-quality 0.23 On-impact dip of annual earnings
pE Contact probability (E) 0.26 E-E flow probability
pU Contact probability (U) 0.45 U-E flow probability
b Value of leisure 1.19 Hall and Milgrom (2008)
x0 Starting productivity 0.58×max[x] E-U flow probability
ps Exo separation probability 0.0014 Pre-displacement earnings
y0 Match-quality in first jobs E[y] ≈ 1 Normalization
Note: Calibrated parameters of the model at monthly frequency. ‘Reason’ refers to empirical estimates found in the
literature. The citations and values of these empirical moments appear chiefly in Table 2.2. ‘APL’ stands for
Average Productivity of Labor.
Table 2.2: Calibration Targets
Moments in the data Data (ĝ) Model (g(θ̂))
Persistence of displacement probability Author: 0.63 (A) 0.80 (A)
Initial spike in displacement probability Author: 25pp 26pp
Recovery of displacement earnings Davis and von Wachter (2011): ˜20% 21%
On-impact dip of annual earnings Davis and von Wachter (2011): ˜30% 27%
Employer-to-employer flows Fallick and Fleischman (2004): 0.026 0.023
Job-finding rate Shimer (2005): 0.45 0.45
Value of leisure Hall and Milgrom (2008): 0.71×APL 0.62×APL
Employment-to-unemployment flows Elsby et al. (2010): 0.015 0.015
Pre-displacement rise in earnings Davis and von Wachter (2011): ˜3% 2%
Note: The middle column presents the value of the moment in the data and the citation. The column on the right
presents the value of the equivalent moment in the model at the calibrated parameter values. The parenthetical (A)
denotes annual frequency moments. ‘APL’ stands for Average Productivity of Labor. ‘pp’ stands for percentage
points.
Table 2.3: Non-Targeted Moments
Moments Data Model
Mean-min wage ratio Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2011): 1.5-2 1.9
Std. dev. of quarterly earnings within matches Topel and Ward (1992): 19% 16%
Persistence of plant productivity Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008): 0.75-0.8 (A) 0.65 (A)
Std. dev. of plant productivity (logs) Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008): 0.21-0.26 (A) 0.29 (A)
Note: The parenthetical (A) denotes annual frequency moments.
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CHAPTER III
Aggregate Labor Market Fluctuations
3.1 Introduction
The partial equilibrium model described in the previous chapter features persis-
tent earnings losses of displaced workers. In this chapter, I use the the model to assess
the implications of the experience of displaced workers for the cyclical dynamics of
job flows. Previous literature assesses how the basic search and matching model ac-
counts for the observed movements in unemployment and vacancies over the business
cycle. The literature starts with Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and has developed
significantly over the last few years.1 Previous models have addressed two distinct
dimensions of the data: amplification and, to a lesser extent, propagation.
With regard to amplification, authors note that data based on the United States
show large movements of the aggregate job-finding rate, as well as the vacancy posting
and unemployment rate, in response to aggregate labor productivity shocks. Leaving
aside the calibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), the basic search and match-
ing model fails in this dimension. If one feeds in realistic aggregate labor productivity
shocks into a basic Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model, the fluctuations in the vacancy
and unemployment rates are an order of magnitude smaller than what one observes




As far as propagation is concerned, authors including Fujita and Ramey (2007)
note that the movement of vacancies and the unemployment rate do not occur contem-
poraneously with productivity movements. In particular, the responses of vacancies
and unemployment peak around 12 and 15 months respectively following a produc-
tivity shock. Again, the basic MP model fails in this dimension: the movement of
vacancies occurs simultaneously with productivity, and, due to a high observed job
finding rate, unemployment responds quickly. In the standard model, unemployment
exhibits a lag of only six months.
In light of this previous literature, the natural question is whether the model out-
lined in the previous chapter has anything to add on this topic. One result from
Chapter II is that the model provides a novel way to calibrate the match-quality
distribution, using the earnings time-path of displaced workers. Intuitively, this dis-
tribution exhibits slow-moving behavior following a negative aggregate productivity
shock as low quality matches are destroyed, and it takes workers time to find new
jobs and slowly climb up the job ladder. One might believe that given the match-
quality persistence exhibited by the partial equilibrium model, the model may deliver
propagation of productivity shocks at the aggregate level. Furthermore, since it takes
time for agents to transit out of low match-qualities, and agents coming out of un-
employment begin at the bottom of the job ladder, this leaves many jobs susceptible
to destruction during a downturn.
In this chapter, I take this possibility seriously. Thus far the model of Chapter
II has featured exogenous job finding rates, and it is in this sense that that model
is a partial equilibrium one. The firm’s decision regarding vacancy posting, and the
determination of aggregate meeting rates do not appear anywhere in the analysis. In
order to study the effect of labor productivity fluctuations on the volatility of the job-
finding rate, vacancies and unemployment this chapter endogenizes the contact rates
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found in the model of Chapter II, and introduces aggregate productivity movements.
This involves introducing an aggregate matching function and the optimal vacancy-
posting decision of the firm, which in turn depends on the steady state distribution
of idiosyncratic productivity (demand) and match-quality among employed workers.
The general equilibrium model is subject to an aggregate productivity shock and
the endogenous response of the economy is depicted. It turns out that, in response to
an aggregate productivity shock, the implications of the match-quality distribution
are somewhat encouraging. The model of Chapter II delivers significant propagation
of aggregate productivity shocks. Unemployment takes around 15 quarters to adjust
to a permanent reduction in aggregate productivity. Vacancies, and therefore the
job-finding rate, take even longer to adjust to an aggregate shock. Average match-
quality initially exhibits a cleansing effect, as low quality matches are destroyed at
the beginning of the downturn, and then a sullying effect as job-finding probabilities
are permanently lower. The amplification of the model is harder to assess, but using
results from persistent shocks as a lower bound, the model seems to deliver sufficient
amplification. The model delivers the procyclicality of the job-finding rate for both
the unemployed and the employed, as well as the countercyclicality of the employment
to unemployment transition rate in the United States.
These results point to a possible resolution of a tension in the search and match-
ing literature. On the one hand, as discussed earlier, matching the wage dispersion
discussed in Hornstein et al. (2011) seems important for matching the persistence
of displaced worker earnings losses. In fact, this chapter continues this theme, and
shows that realistic wage dispersion seems like a necessary, but not sufficient, con-
dition for matching the earnings losses of displaced workers. On the other hand,
in a recent paper, Bils et al. (2011) point out that the baseline MP model faces a
trade-off between matching observed dispersion in wage growth across workers and
realistic cyclical fluctuations in unemployment. In particular, with large wage dis-
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persion, which requires large dispersion in match-quality, few individuals are at the
destruction threshold. In the context of Bils et al. (2011), this means that an aggre-
gate productivity shock affects few relationships and therefore engenders only small
movements in unemployment and vacancies. This suggests that mere churn at the
bottom of the productivity distribution is insufficient to explain the dynamics of labor
market aggregates. Moreover large match-quality dispersion implies large surplus in
employment relationships and small movements in accounting profits in response to
aggregate productivity shocks.2 The model in this dissertation helps resolve some
of these tensions by introducing both match-quality and idiosyncratic productivity.
Low quality matches among new hires, along with a reasonable productivity process,
allow the model to simultaneously deliver the wage dispersion required to match the
persistence in earnings losses associated with displacement and realistic fluctuations
in unemployment in response to aggregate shocks. Moreover, fixing the initial match-
quality allows the framework to deliver observed wage dispersion without requiring
an implausibly small value of leisure.
The model is also subject to exogenous separation shocks, which have been used
in the past in order to assess search and matching models. This type of shock has
more bite because all agents are exposed to exogenous separations whereas the aggre-
gate productivity shock only affects those individuals at the reservation threshold. A
shock to exogenous separations demonstrates that the model can deliver even more
propagation. On impact vacancies fall as an increased separation probability lowers
the value of a filled job. As new unemployed workers find jobs they lower the average
match-quality as these workers start towards the bottom of the job ladder. The aver-
age E-E probability rises as new unemployed workers find jobs at low-quality matches
and move quickly up the job ladder. This increased chance of poaching an employed
2Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) show that reducing the surplus from employment relationships
can significantly increase the volatility of unemployment and vacancies in the baseline MP model.
Conversely, with large accounting profits, the baseline model fails to amplify aggregate productivity
shocks.
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worker raises the payoff from meeting an employed worker, which encourages firms
to post more vacancies. Since the average match-quality is a slow moving object,
governed by endogenous worker flows, this process takes a significant amount of time.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the tension
between matching wage dispersion and cyclical volatility in a simpler version of the
model presented in Chapter II, a model very similar to that found in Bils et al. (2011).
This simpler model is calibrated in two different ways: the “benchmark” calibration
which delivers observed wage dispersion, and the “high-elasticity” calibration which
delivers significant cyclical volatility. In this section I lean heavily on results and
calibrations from Hornstein et al. (2011) and Bils et al. (2011), particularly with
an eye towards the earnings losses of displaced workers. Section 3.3 extends the
model presented in Chapter II (hereafter referred to as the full model) to a general
equilibrium framework. Section 3.4 presents steady-state features of this model, and
Section 3.5 presents transition dynamics of key endogenous variables in response to
an aggregate productivity shock. Section 3.6 presents impulse response functions for
a separation shock. Section 3.7 summarizes.
3.2 Simple Model
To gain intuition for the aggregate dynamics of the model presented in Chapter
II, this section presents a simpler version of that model (henceforth referred to as the
simple model). The framework still incorporates search and matching, and is in large
part the same as the model in Chapter II, aside from three exceptions. First, the
model presented here features no match quality, denoted by y in the previous chap-
ter. The output of every match is a linear function of the idiosyncratic productivity,
denoted by x, and distributed according to F (x′|x). Second, the model presented
here features no E-E transitions. Hence, this model features no job ladder. Third,
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the model here features no exogenous separations. All separations are endogenous.3
There are substantive differences between this model and the full model. First, firms
do not contact employed workers in the simple model. Since the evolution of produc-
tivity and match-quality among employed workers is slow, this can lead to additional
propagation in the full model. Second, the addition of a second state variable in
the full model allows the economy to lose many productive matches in a downturn,
while still allowing new matches to survive. In the simple model, one cannot shed
relationships at the starting productivity level because then no new employment re-
lationships would form. I discuss these additions, and their important implications,
when I elucidate the aggregate implications of the full model.
The number of new meetings between the unemployed and vacancies is determined
by an aggregate matching function:
m(v, u) = m0u
1−αvα
where v is the number of vacancies and u is the number of unemployed workers. The




= m(v/u, 1) = m(θ, 1)




= m(1, u/v) = m(1, 1/θ)
This model can be characterized by a series of Bellman equations. The value of
3In other words this is a simplification of the full model with y0 = 1, σεy = 0, pE = 0 and s = 0.
Perceptive readers will note that this is the standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model where
shocks to productivity arrive every period and the idiosyncratic productivity process is persistent,
as opposed to memoryless.
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work to the employee, W (x), satisfies:
W (x) = w + δ
∫
max{U,W (x′)}dFx(x′|x) (3.1)
The intuition here is straightforward. The flow payoff to maintaining a job equals
the wage, w. In the future, shocks to idiosyncratic productivity arrive according to
distribution F (x′|x) and, depending on the the level of this future shock, the worker
decides whether to remain at the current firm, or flow into unemployment and look
for an alternative match.
The value of unemployment satisfies:
U = b+ δ(1− f(θ))U + δf(θ)W (x0) (3.2)
The unemployed receive flow payoff b. They either receive an offer and take it or
remain unemployed. Notice that all jobs start at the same level of idiosyncratic
productivity, x0, which is set to the mean value of the unconditional distribution,
denoted by x̄. The calibration presented later guarantees that W (x0) > U , so that
the worker prefers employment to unemployment at the starting productivity level.
The value of a filled job to the firm, J(x), satisfies:
J(x) = z + x− w + δ
∫
max{0, J(x′)}dFx(x′|x) (3.3)
where z denotes aggregate productivity. The payoff to the firm includes the output,
z+x, less the wage paid to the worker, w. In the next period, depending on the level
of the idiosyncratic shock, the firm decides to continue with the match or to let the
worker go and open a vacancy. In equilibrium vacancies are assumed to have value
zero, which is guaranteed by a free-entry condition into vacancy posting.
Notice that I choose an additive output form between aggregate and idiosyncratic
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productivity to avoid any ambiguity about whether increased aggregate productivity
lowers the reservation threshold of idiosyncratic productivity. With additive output,
xR is unambiguously decreasing in z. With multiplicative output, xR could increase
with increased z. As a matter of fact, in their baseline calibration, Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) have xR increasing with z, and they elucidate some of the conditions
for this result.
These value functions can be summarized by one equation, the surplus from a
match:
S(x) = W (x)− U + J(x)
= z + x+ δ
∫
max{0, S(x′)}dFx(x′|x)− [b+ δf(θ)βS(x0)]
(3.4)
which is the flow payoff from the match and the continuation value of the match, less
the worker’s outside option that includes a flow payoff from unemployment and the
chance of finding a new job with idiosyncratic productivity at x0.
Proposition III.1. The surplus equation, S(x), is increasing in x.
With the monotonicity of S(·) established, define the reservation cutoff as the
level of productivity that makes worker and firm indifferent between maintaining the
current match and terminating the current employment relationship:
S(xR) = 0 (3.5)
In order to determine the number of vacancies in equilibrium, we need the value
of posting a vacancy:
V s = −c+ δq(θ)(1− β)S(x0) (3.6)
where c is the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy, q(θ) is the job-filling probability
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Wage bargaining follows the standard Nash bargaining protocol so that:
w = arg max
w
[W (x)− U ]
1
2 [J(x)− V ]
1
2
This implies that worker and the firm split surplus evenly.
3.2.1 Calibration of Simple Model
Given the optimal decisions of workers and firms, the model generates simulated
data at a monthly frequency. In particular, I simulate 6,000 agents for 480 months
(40 years). To remove the effects of initial conditions, I simulate the model for 980
months and then discard the first 500 months of the sample. This simulation provides
a time-path of wages and annual earnings, as well as an employment history.
This section outlines two alternative calibration methods. One includes a standard
calibration that implies little aggregate volatility but matches wage dispersion. The
second calibration, dubbed the “high-elasticity” calibration, delivers more cyclicality
in vacancies and unemployment at the cost of matching the observed mean-min wage
ratio.
Although the first calibration delivers a large mean-min wage ratio, neither cali-
bration manages to hit the earnings losses of displaced workers. This highlights that
the ability of the model of Chapter II to hit the time-path of displaced worker earn-
ings is an achievement in and of itself. Furthermore, this analysis shows that simply
delivering a large mean-min wage ratio is not enough to deliver the earnings experi-
ence of displaced workers. A job ladder and on-the-job search are crucial ingredients
to the success of the model in Chapter II.
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The model period length is one month. In what follows, idiosyncratic productivity
starts out at a fixed and deterministic level x0 in all matches, and then within the
match follows a log AR(1) process:
lnx′ = ρx lnx+ ε
′
x (3.8)
where ε′x ∼ N (0, σ2εx). This process captures the intuition that productivity at the
match level, or demand for the match’s output, exhibits some persistence.
3.2.1.1 The Benchmark Calibration
This calibration follows Hornstein et al. (2011) and Bils et al. (2011) very closely.
Table 3.1 shows the baseline parameter values for the two calibrations. I take the
annualized interest rate to be five percent. The key targeted outcomes are the average
rates of unemployment and separations. Following Bils et al. (2011) I target an
average unemployment rate of six percent, and a monthly separation of two percent
that is consistent with work using the Survey of Income and Program Participation.
The two percent separation rate and the six percent unemployment rate pin down
the steady-state monthly job-finding rate at 31 percent.
The vacancy posting cost c is chosen to normalize the steady-state vacancy-
unemployment ratio (θ) to one. The matching technology is Cobb-Douglas; m(v, u) =
0.31vαu1−α, which hits the steady-state finding rate. The matching power parameter
α is set to 0.5. In the benchmark calibration I fix the persistence of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity at 0.97, the value in Bils et al. (2011), to match highly persistent individual
wage earnings. I choose the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity to match
an observed mean-min wage ratio of 1.75, as documented by Hornstein et al. (2011).
I choose the value of leisure, b, to match the two percent separation probability.4
4An alternative calibration involves fixing the value of leisure at 0.4, the value found in Shimer
(2005) and choosing σεx to match the two percent separation probability. This calibration falls
far short of the observed mean-min wage ratio, but conveys the same message: the standard search
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Notice that in order to match the duration of unemployment and the mean-min
wage ratio, the model requires a negative value of leisure. Hornstein et al. (2011)
point out the same phenomenon. Their main message is that the wage dispersion
delivered by search models is constrained by preference parameters and the observed
size of the transition rates of workers. The intuition is that if we observe very large
U-E rates this must mean that the wage offer distribution is not very dispersed,
otherwise workers would be willing to wait longer for a potentially better offer. With
the particular set up outlined here, the U-E probability is calibrated to 31 percent
and the E-U probability at two percent. In order to simultaneously target a large
mean-min wage ratio (1.75) and the large U-E flows, the model requires the value of
leisure to be almost twice the (negative) average wage among the employed. This low
value of leisure insures that, despite the large wage dispersion, the model can match
the observed U-E probability. As Hornstein et al. (2011) point out, this means that,
if the average wage is $2000 per month, and b is equal to (negative) the average wage,
in order to avoid unemployment a worker is willing to work for free for one month,
pay $2000, and at the end of the month look for a job with starting productivity x0.
This seems economically unpalatable.
3.2.1.2 The High-Elasticity Calibration
To portray the tension in this basic model, I also consider a calibration of the model
that delivers a significant elasticity of unemployment and vacancies with respect to
the aggregate productivity shock. In particular, I target the empirical response of
unemployment in response to a reduction in aggregate productivity. An empirical
comparison to a permanent reduction in aggregate productivity is difficult to find,
but Fujita and Ramey (2007) present an empirical estimate of the response of un-
model faces a trade-off between matching the observed cross-sectional wage distribution, which seems
necessary for matching the earnings losses of displaced workers, and matching the cyclical volatility
of unemployment.
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employment to a persistent reduction in aggregate productivity.5 They find that the
maximum response of unemployment is around 6.5 percent after five quarters. This
means that if unemployment was at five percent, and aggregate productivity fell by
10 percent, then unemployment would rise to just above eight percent. Since the
persistent shock response is a lower bound for the permanent shock response, I target
an eight percent increase in unemployment after five quarters.
To achieve this amplification I use two parameters: b and σεx , keeping all other
parameters at the benchmark values. Notice that increasing either parameter in-
creases the average unemployment rate because higher b makes unemployment more
attractive, and higher σεx makes matches more susceptible to endogenous destruc-
tion. However, the effect of increasing these parameters on the cyclicality of unem-
ployment moves in opposite directions. Increasing b tends to reduce the surplus from
employment which raises the cyclicality of unemployment with respect to aggregate
productivity shocks. Increasing σεx makes the idiosyncratic productivity distribution
more spread out. Over time workers sort into matches with significant match surplus,
which makes separations less sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in productivity.
Because the level of unemployment is increasing in both b and σεx , but its cycli-
cality depends inversely on σεx and positively on b, I can maintain a steady-state
unemployment rate of six percent and increase the cyclicality of unemployment by
raising b and lowering σεx . I find that a combination of b = 0.77 and σεx = 0.05 yields
a six percent unemployment rate and the appropriate deviation from steady-state
unemployment in response to a productivity shock.
5Section 3.8.2 replicates the findings of Fujita and Ramey (2007) by analyzing the response of
unemployment and vacancies in the standard MP model. The standard model fails to amplify and
propagate aggregate productivity shocks.
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3.2.2 Steady State of Simple Model
This section outlines some steady-state features of the two calibrations of the
simple model. The focus of the analysis is on the ability of the two calibrations to
match observed cross sectional wage facts and the earnings losses of displaced workers.
The distribution of idiosyncratic productivity is largely responsible for the model’s
earnings implications, and this distribution is described in detail.
Table 3.2 presents some steady-state moments of the simulated data, and Figure
3.1 presents the earnings losses of displaced workers in these two models, along with
the empirical losses from Davis and von Wachter (2011). For the figure, I impose the
same restrictions as in Chapter II.
Both calibrations can match the targeted moments exactly, hitting the unemploy-
ment rate, the separation rate and the job finding rate. Reflecting the small shocks
to idiosyncratic productivity, the high-elasticity calibration exhibits very little cross-
sectional variation in wages, at only 7.5 percent. This is unreasonably small. As
an empirical reference, Topel and Ward (1992) report that the standard deviation of
wage growth within matches is around 19 percent. As another testament to the small
productivity shocks, the earnings losses of displaced workers are very small. Figure
3.1 shows that in the high-elasticity calibration earnings recover six years after dis-
placement. Moreover, the on-impact dip in earnings is very small: only around 15
percent, whereas in the data this figure is between 25 and 40 percent.
The benchmark calibration delivers significantly more wage dispersion, obtaining
an observed mean-min wage ratio of 1.75, and around 36 percent cross-sectional vari-
ation in wages. The standard deviation of wage growth within matches is around
33 percent, which exceeds 19 percent value in Topel and Ward (1992). Figure 3.1
plots the earnings losses of displaced workers associated with this calibration. The
on-impact dip in earnings over-shoots the observed losses, however the recovery in
earnings is far too quick. With this calibration, earnings, relative to a control group,
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recover within eight years. The earnings losses are remarkably symmetric around the
year of displacement.6
Figure 3.1 also reinforces that matching the earnings losses of displaced workers
presented in Chapter II is a modeling success because many similar models simply
cannot deliver this prominent empirical fact. Even models that display a realis-
tic amount of wage dispersion, like the benchmark calibration presented here, cannot
match the trajectory of earnings around the time of displacement. It seems as though
wage dispersion is important for capturing the on-impact dip in earnings, but insuf-
ficient to deliver the slow recovery in earnings post displacement. All the ingredients
of the model presented in Chapter II, including on-the-job search and match-quality
are important ingredients for matching displaced worker earnings.7
One key to understanding wage dispersion in both of these calibrations, and for
understanding the aggregate implications for job destruction, is the underlying steady-
state distribution of idiosyncratic productivity. The numerical approach for obtaining
this steady-state distribution is detailed in Section 3.8.3.1. Figure 3.2 presents these
steady-state distributions above each economy’s reservation productivity xR.
8 Each
distribution peaks at the starting idiosyncratic productivity x0, as there exists a mass
of unemployed workers entering employment at this productivity level.
This figure highlights that the high-elasticity calibration features a very tight dis-
tribution of idiosyncratic productivity near the threshold productivity. This narrow
distribution helps this calibration to match the cyclical volatility of unemployment
because small movements in aggregate productivity terminate many employment re-
lationships. This resulting increased volatility comes at the cost of missing the disper-
6The pre-displacement dip in earnings occurs because of endogenous separations and persistence
in the idiosyncratic productivity process. Conditional on displacement in year y, agents’ earnings
are falling in the years before y as idiosyncratic productivity begins to fall. In contrast, based on
no separation in year y, the average idiosyncratic productivity of the control group begins to rise
before year y.
7Note that the model presented here does feature some serial correlation in displacements because
the starting idiosyncratic productivity is below the average x among the employed.
8This is similar to Figure 5 in Bils et al. (2011).
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sion of wages and the dispersion of wage growth within matches, as described earlier in
this section. The benchmark calibration features a much more disperse idiosyncratic
productivity distribution, which means that this economy features realistic wage and
wage growth dispersion. However, this calibration exhibits very small fluctuations in
unemployment and vacancies because downward aggregate productivity movements
affect few matches. The figure shows that near the reservation threshold for the
benchmark calibration, there exists a small mass of matches.
In addition to the job destruction margin, the job creation margin plays an impor-
tant role in aggregate dynamics. As noted before, the value of leisure is very small in
the benchmark calibration. This allows the model to simultaneously hit the job find-
ing rate, and the large wage-dispersion observed in the data. A small value of leisure
implies that the surplus from employment relationships is very large. Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) show that the volatility of labor market tightness is very closely
related to the value of leisure and the size of accounting profits. This calibration fea-
tures large accounting profits which means that the vacancy posting incentives in this
economy will largely be muted. Conversely, in the high-elasticity calibration the value
of leisure is high, making the accounting profits from an employment relationships
very small. This raises the cyclicality of profits and hence raises the cyclicality of
vacancy posting. The job creation margin also features prominently in the aggregate
fluctuations, which I point out in the next section.
3.2.3 Aggregate Fluctuations in Simple Model
This section presents the responses of the two calibrated economies to a perma-
nent reduction in aggregate productivity. The algorithm for computing the perfect
foresight transition is outlined in Section 3.8.3.3. The procedure follows Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987) and Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010) quite closely and involves
guessing both the time to full adjustment and the trajectory of labor market tight-
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ness, solving for surplus equations via backward induction, and solving forwards for
the evolution of unemployment, labor market tightness and the distribution of id-
iosyncratic productivity.9 The aggregate shock involves a one-time, unanticipated,
permanent reduction in aggregate productivity.10 Once the initial shock arrives, the
entire future path of z is revealed to the agents of the economy.
Figure 3.3 portrays the results for the benchmark calibration in response to this
aggregate productivity reduction.11 As a reference, I also depict the estimated re-
sponses of unemployment and vacancies from Fujita and Ramey (2007), keeping in
mind that these are responses to a persistent shock rather than a permanent shock.
The economy delivers little amplification of the aggregate productivity shock. The
response in vacancies is about an order of magnitude lower than in the observed
data, and exhibits none of the propagation seen in the data. Unemployment rises,
but significantly less than in the observed data.
On impact, the inflow rate into unemployment jumps up as low productivity
matches are destroyed due to the reduction in aggregate productivity. This destruc-
tion of low productivity matches causes the average idiosyncratic productivity in the
economy to rise. Vacancies fall only slightly on impact. This is due to the low value
of leisure, which implies large surplus from employment relationships so that the in-
centives to post vacancies do not change much in response to aggregate productivity
fluctuations. The model displays a sharp rise in E-U separation in the wake of a
recession that then subsides and falls to the new steady state.
9Computing the response of the economy to a stochastic aggregate productivity shock would be
much more involved, including an application of Krusell and Smith (1998). The procedure presented
here satisfactorily presents the mechanics and results of the model. I suspect that amending the
nature of the shock would not alter the implications.
10Since aggregate productivity is not modeled as a stochastic process, this shock is a zero proba-
bility event.
11In practice, the size of the shock is 1.2 times the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity
in steady-state for the benchmark economy, and 1.5 times the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
productivity in steady-state for the high-elasticity economy. This is so that the number of nodes
switching from positive to negative surplus are the same in the two simulations. The responses here
are normalized by the size of the shock so that they represent responses to a one percent reduction
in aggregate productivity as a fraction of the average x in the initial steady state.
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Figure 3.4 displays the aggregate fluctuations of the high-elasticity calibration.
This model features the targeted amplification in unemployment, around eight per-
cent five quarters after the shock. The model delivers the same amount of propagation
in unemployment as the standard MP model: unemployment takes around two quar-
ters to converge to the new steady-state value. Vacancies move more than in the
benchmark economy, but exhibit no propagation. The larger change in vacancies is
due to smaller accounting profits in employment relationships as a result of a higher
value of leisure. This is analogous to the results in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008),
although the value of leisure in the high-elasticity calibration is quite far from aver-
age labor productivity and hence this economy displays less amplitude than the data.
Although the inflow rate and the average idiosyncratic productivity look qualitatively
the same as in the benchmark calibration, the quantitative response is much larger.
Inflows respond around five times more than in the benchmark calibration. The aver-
age idiosyncratic productivity rises more than in the benchmark economy. This larger
inflow at the onset of the recession follows from the tight distribution of idiosyncratic
productivity near the reservation threshold. With a reduction in aggregate productiv-
ity, many employment relationships are destroyed and the unemployment rate jumps
significantly. The unemployment rate also rises due to a lower job-finding rate due
to fewer posted vacancies.
3.3 Closing the Full Model
For a description of the full model and the baseline calibration I refer the reader
to Chapter II of this dissertation. This section outlines how to couch the full model
of the previous chapter in a general equilibrium framework, including an aggregate
matching function and optimal vacancy posting by firms. Suppose that two matching
functions determine the number of contacts that occur between unemployed and
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employed workers and firms in the economy every period.12 Let v denote the number
of vacancies in the economy. As with the simple model, I assume Cobb-Douglas
matching functions so that the number of contacts equals:
mi(s, v) = m
i
0v
αs1−α, i ∈ {U,E}
where s denotes the measure of searchers and mi0 is the matching efficiency. In the
full model both unemployed and employed agents search and therefore s = 1 and the
matching function satisfies:13
mi(1, v) = m
i
0v
α, i ∈ {U,E}




= mi(1, v) = m
i
0v
α, i ∈ {U,E}








α−1, i ∈ {U,E}
With this addition to the model, I can determine the contact rates given the number
of vacancies in the economy.
I still need to determine how many vacancies firms open in equilibrium. To deter-
mine the equilibrium vacancy rate I introduce the vacancy creation condition. This
condition represents the costs and benefits from opening a vacancy for an individual
firm, and can be written as:
12As mentioned before, this is a reduced form way of incorporating search intensity into the model.
It is necessary that the contact rates for the unemployed and the employed differ because pU 6= pE .
13See Moretensen and Nagypal (2005) for a similar set up. I use α = 0.524 in this part of the
dissertation, which is taken from Moretensen and Nagypal (2005) and captures the elasticity of the
job-finding rate with respect to vacancies.
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V =− c+ δqU (v)umax{0, J(x0, y0)}+ δqE(v)(1− u)×∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
I{S(x0, ỹ) > S(x′, y)}max{0, J(x0, ỹ)}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ)π̃(x, y)dxdy
where c is the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy and u is the unemployment rate.
π̃(x, y) is the distribution of (x, y) among employed workers, a complicated equilib-
rium object.14 I assume that in equilibrium V = 0 due to free entry into vacancies.
This equation involves J(·, ·). It can be rewritten as a function of only the surplus
from a match with the identity S = J+W −U and the fact that Nash bargaining im-
plies that J(x, y) = (1− β)S(x, y). This implies that the vacancy creation condition
is:
V =− c+ δqU (v)umax{0, (1− β)S(x0, y0)}+ δqE(v)(1− u)×∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
I{S(x0, ỹ) > S(x′, y)}max{0, (1− β)S(x0, ỹ)}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ)dΠ̃(x, y)
= −c+ δmU0 vα−1uEu + δmE0 vα−1(1− u)Ee
(3.9)
where Π̃(x, y) is the cumulative density function associated with (x, y) among em-
ployed workers (conditional on employment). Notice that when we set V = 0, this
equation implies that the flow cost of opening a vacancy must equal the expected
benefit from maintaining that open vacancy. The benefit from posting a vacancy
has two parts: the payoff from meeting an unemployed worker, Eu, and the payoff
from meeting an employed worker, Ee. The payoff to meeting an unemployed worker
is simply the portion of surplus that the firm receives at combination (x0, y0). The
14This is in fact the distribution of (x, y) conditional on employment so that it sums to one. When
finding this distribution I iterate on the unconditional distribution, π(x, y) so that
∑
x,y π(x, y)+u =
1. The two functions are related by the simple equation: π(x,y)1−u = π̃(x, y).
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payoff from meeting an employed worker depends on whether the poaching firm suc-
cessfully attracts the worker and the poaching firm’s payoff from this new employment
relationship. If we know the expected benefit from posting a vacancy, this equation
pins down the equilibrium vacancy rate. Notice that now the expected payoff from
meeting an employed worker enters the optimal decision of the firm. This presents
an important deviation from the simple model presented earlier and the standard
MP model that both feature no on-the-job search. In this context, searching while
employed has consequences for aggregate dynamics.
3.4 Steady State of Full Model
Many of the steady-state features of the full model have been presented in Chapter
II. We know that this model performs well at matching displaced worker earnings,
wage dispersion and the standard deviation of wage growth within matches. However,
the full model manages to avoid some of the symptoms of the benchmark economy
presented earlier. This is not obvious since the full model is a generalization of the
simple model with additional dispersion in match-quality. The addition of match-
quality, however, helps the full model alleviate some of the tensions described above.
The algorithm for solving for the steady-state distribution in the full model is pre-
sented in Section 3.8.4.1.
For illustration, define xRmax[y|S<0] and y
R
avg[x] as:
S(xRmax[y|S<0],max[y|S < 0]) = 0 and S(avg[x], yRavg[x]) = 0 (3.10)
That is, xRmax[y|S<0] is the reservation productivity level when match-quality is at
the highest match-quality that accepts an endogenous separation, and yRavg[x] is the
reservation match-quality when x is at its average value in equilibrium.15
15There exist some match-qualities for which separation occurs only via exogenous separation, i.e.
for all productivity values on the grid at these match-qualities, surplus is positive.
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Figure 3.5 shows the steady-state distributions of x and y in the full model with
the baseline calibration presented in Chapter II. The line labeled ‘π(x|max[y|S < 0])’
shows the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity above the reservation productiv-
ity xRmax[y|S<0], holding match-quality at max[y|S < 0]. This shows that idiosyncratic
productivity is spread out and implies that relatively few matches exist near the
destruction threshold. This is analogous to the benchmark calibration of the sim-
ple model. The spike in the figure occurs at x = x0, and shows that the starting
productivity lies at the top of the distribution.16 The line labeled ‘π(y|avg[x])’ in
the figure shows the distribution of match-quality above the reservation productivity
yRavg[x], holding productivity at avg[x]. This paints a different picture from the con-
ditional distribution of x. In particular, there now exists a spike at the bottom of
the distribution at y = y0. This makes clear that y0 is quite low in the distribution
of y. It also shows that there exist a large fraction of employment relationships near
the destruction threshold. Small movements in aggregate productivity will erase a
large fraction of employment relationships that have the starting match-quality. This
will have a large impact on the E-U probability in transition and therefore the unem-
ployment rate. In this sense the full model can alleviate some of the tensions of the
simple model. Introducing a second state variable that is particularly low among new
matches means that many employment relationships are susceptible to destruction
with a reduction in aggregate productivity. At the same time, new matches are still
viable.
3.5 Aggregate Fluctuations in Full Model
This section presents the business cycle movements of the baseline model. The
algorithm for computing the perfect foresight transition is outlined in Section 3.8.4.3,
16This stems from the properties of the model. Since y0 << E[y|match], it is necessary for
x0 >> E[x|match] to induce vacancy posting.
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and is similar to the technique used for the simple economy.
Figure 3.6 depicts the outcomes of key aggregate variables in response to a per-
manent, unexpected, one percent reduction in aggregate productivity.17 The model
displays a sharp rise in E-U separation in the wake of a recession that then falls
slightly and continues to rise thereafter to its new steady state value. The rise in in-
flows results from a discrete mass of jobs becoming unprofitable and being destroyed
immediately. The new steady state of the E-U probability is above the original steady
state due to a lower aggregate productivity, which means more jobs are fragile. The
response of the inflow rate is very large, reflecting that many employment relation-
ships are near the destruction threshold due to the low match-quality of new hires.
There is a slight cleansing effect as low-quality matches are destroyed. Due to lower
aggregate productivity, firms post fewer vacancies which results in lower job-finding
rates. This causes average match-quality to fall as agents make their way up the job
ladder at a reduced rate. This is the central point of a related paper, Barlevy (2002).
The economy delivers a large response in unemployment rate due to the large rise
in the inflow rate. The rise in unemployment, and the large expected payoff from
meeting an unemployed worker, dampen the negative effect of lower productivity
on vacancies. The economy also delivers significant propagation of shocks, with the
majority of unemployment adjustment occurring within the first 15 quarters. After
60 quarters, vacancies are still not at their new steady state.18 This is due to the slow
moving nature of the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity and match-quality
among the employed.
17The shock is actually a reduction in aggregate productivity by half the standard deviation of
x · y in the initial steady state (a 15 percent reduction in productivity as a fraction of the average
x · y in the initial steady state). The responses are normalized by the size of the shock to represent
the response to a one percent decrease in aggregate productivity as a fraction of average x · y in the
initial steady state. Since the model is non-linear, this normalization may not be appropriate.
18Notice that although the expected payoff from meeting an employed worker falls and then rises,
vacancies do not exhibit the same feature. This is because unemployment is rising as well, and since
the expected payoff from meeting and unemployed worker exceeds the expected payoff from meeting
an employed worker, vacancies actually rise after their initial reduction.
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These impulse responses show that the baseline economy behaves remarkably like
the actual economy. In the wake of recession there is a spike in the layoff rate, while
the job-finding rate for the employed and the unemployed falls, just as observed in
empirical worker flows in the United States data (see, for example, Elsby et al., 2009).
The model delivers significant propagation of aggregate shocks.
3.6 Separation Shocks
Up to now the analysis has focused on the response of the economy to an ag-
gregate productivity shock. Some authors, for example Shimer (2005), also look at
the shocks to the exogenous separation rate. This section studies the effect of such
a shock in the present context. This type of shock is interesting because a change
in the exogenous separation rate will affect individuals with all (x, y) combinations
whereas, with the productivity shock, only individuals near the destruction threshold
experience separation. I could not perform this shock with the simple model because
that model features endogenous separations only.
This section assumes that the exogenous separation probability rises unexpect-
edly.19 Figure 3.7 depicts the response of key aggregate variables in response to this
separation rate shock. Notice that the model delivers significant propagation in va-
cancies due to the slow moving distribution of (x, y). On impact, the inflow rate
jumps due to the increased exogenous separation rate. Vacancies fall on impact as
increased separation lowers the value of a filled job. As new unemployed workers find
jobs they lower the average match-quality as these workers start towards the bottom
of the job ladder. Match-quality in the new steady-state is lower due to the increased
risk of separation, which knocks individuals off the ladder more often. After a slight
initial reduction, due to the large fall in vacancies and therefore the job contact rate
19In the simulation I double the exogenous separation probability and then normalize the impulse
responses appropriately.
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among the employed, the average E-E probability rises as new unemployed workers
find jobs at low-quality matches and move quickly up the job ladder.20 This increased
chance of poaching an employed worker raises the payoff from meeting an employed
worker, which encourages firms to post more vacancies. Increased unemployment
also encourages vacancy posting as the expected payoff from meeting an unemployed
worker exceeds the expected payoff from meeting an employed worker. Vacancies and
unemployment move very slowly, analogously to the aggregate productivity shock,
although unemployment displays more propagation with the separation shock.
The amplification of the shock is a little harder to assess, but the unemployment
rate rises by around 0.2 percent on impact. In the Great Recession, for example,
layoffs rose by around 50 percent, which is 50 times the shock presented here, and
the unemployment rate went up by around 100 percent. Under linearity, this would
imply that the model, in response to a separation shock, does not feature sufficient
amplification of separation shocks.
3.7 Summary and Discussion
This chapter investigates the aggregate labor market fluctuations associated with
the model presented in Chapter II of this dissertation. Closing the model involves
introducing aggregate matching functions for the unemployed and the employed, and
introducing the optimal vacancy creation condition for the firm. A simpler version of
the full model, with no match-quality, no E-E transitions and no exogenous separa-
tions, faces a tension between matching the observed mean-min wage ratio and the
earnings of displaced workers, and matching the amplification of aggregate produc-
tivity shocks. With idiosyncratic shocks that deliver the correct mean-min wage ratio
there exist very few matches at the destruction threshold which implies that aggre-
gate productivity shocks have very little bite. In addition to little job destruction,
20This is at odds with an empirically pro-cyclical E-E probability.
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this calibration of the model implies large accounting profits which means that few
jobs are destroyed in response to lower aggregate productivity.
This tension is mitigated in the full model. This is not obvious since the full
model resembles the simple model, but features additional volatility due to variation
in match-quality. Since variation in idiosyncratic productivity was the reason for a
lack of amplification of aggregate productivity shocks in the simple model, it may
seem that adding additional volatility via match-quality would exacerbate the ampli-
fication problem in the full model. Despite this additional volatility, the full model
delivers significant unemployment amplification because new matches begin with low
match-quality which implies that there exist many relationships at the reservation
frontier. Relationships with this starting match-quality can be destroyed in the full
model because relationships are characterized by two state variables: idiosyncratic
productivity and match-quality. In the simple model eliminating employment rela-
tionships with the starting productivity was not a possibility because then no new
matches would form. In the full model aggregate productivity shocks have large
effects on unemployment, and responses that are qualitatively consistent with the
observed facts. In the wake of recession there is a spike in the layoff rate, and the
job-finding rate for the employed and the unemployed falls. An aggregate separation
shock engenders far more propagation as it affects the entire distribution, not just
those at the job destruction threshold.
The model is able to hit the wage dispersion documented by Hornstein et al.
(2011) without resorting to a very low value of leisure because the initial match-
quality does not vary. In this version of the model the initial match-quality is fixed at
y0. This implies that there exists a large mass of jobs at the destruction frontier that
results in large movements in unemployment in response to aggregate productivity
shocks. The initial match-quality does not need to be fixed for this effect, but the
amplification properties do require that unemployed workers draw match-quality from
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Proposition III.1. The surplus equation, S(x), is increasing in x.
Proof. From Nash bargaining, S(x) = J(x)
1−β . Hence, showing that J(x) is increasing in
x will suffice to establish that S(x) is increasing in x. Unfortunately, J(x) depends
on w which itself is a function of x. Hence, I will first derive a closed form solution
for w.
Multiply equation (3.1) by (1 − β) and equation (3.3) by β. Subtract the first
equation from the second to get
βJ(x)− (1− β)W (x) = βz + βx− βw + βδ
∫
max{0, J(x′)}dFx(x′|x)
− (1− β)w − (1− β)δ
∫
max{U,W (x′)}dFx(x′|x)
⇒ βJ(x)− (1− β)W (x) = βz + βx− βw + βδ
∫
max{0, J(x′)}dFx(x′|x)
− (1− β)w − (1− β)δ
∫
max{0,W (x′)− U}dFx(x′|x)− (1− β)δU
Since (1− β)(W (x)−U) = βJ(x), (W (x)−U) and J(x) always have the same sign.
This implies that
βJ(x)− (1− β)W (x) = βz + βx− w
+ δ
∫
max{0, βJ(x′)− (1− β)(W (x′)− U)}dFx(x′|x)− (1− β)δU
and the term under the integral is zero. Also, from Nash bargaining βJ(x) − (1 −
β)W (x) = −(1− β)U :
−(1− β)U = βz + βx− w − (1− β)δU
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which implies that
w = β(z + x) + (1− β)(1− δ)U
Equation (3.2) implies that
(1− δ)U = b+ δf(θ)(W (x0)− U) (3.11)





where the last equality follows from equation
(3.6) and V s = 0. Plugging this into equation (3.11) yields




which in turn implies that
w = (1− β)b+ β(z + x+ cθ)
since f(θ)
q(θ)
= θ. This is the standard wage equation from a simple MP model.
With the wage equation in hand, the value of a filled job to the firm becomes
J(x) = (1− β)(z + x− b)− βcθ + δ
∫
max{0, J(x′)}dFx(x′|x)
Define T as the operator mapping bounded functions into bounded functions:
T : F → F . In particular, let T satisfy:
(Tf)(x) = (1− β)(z + x− b)− βcθ + δ
∫
max{0, f(x′)}dFx(x′|x)
I will show that T is a contraction mapping, and then show that it maps weakly
increasing functions into weakly increasing functions. This will suffice to show that
J(x), the unique fixed point of T , is weakly increasing in x.
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To show that T is a contraction mapping, I confirm that Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions for a contraction hold here. To verify discounting, note that:
[T (f + a)](x) = (Tf)(x) + aδ(1− f(θ)β)) ≤ (Tf)(x) + ∆a
where ∆ < 1. To verify monotonicity, suppose that f(x) ≥ g(x)∀x. Then note that:







[max{0, f(x′)} −max{0, g(x′)}]dFx(x′|x) ≥ 0
It follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem that T has a unique fixed point.
Now, suppose that f(·) is weakly increasing, so that whenever x1 ≥ x2 this implies
that f(x1) ≥ f(x2). Then:







The first term on the right hand side is weakly positive. The second term is weakly
positive if a higher x today implies a higher expectation of max{0, f(x′)}. Since
max{0, f(x′)} is assumed weakly increasing, a sufficient condition for this term to
be weakly positive is that Fx(x
′|x1) first order stochastically dominates Fx(x′|x2). In
other words, Fx(x
′|x1) ≤ Fx(x′|x2) for all x′ if x1 ≥ x2. I assume a log AR(1) process
for x, which implies that Fx(x





max{0, f(x′)}dFx(x′|x2) ≥ 0, which means that T
maps weakly increasing functions into weakly increasing functions. Hence, J(x), the
unique fixed point of T , is weakly increasing in x, which implies that S(x) is weakly
increasing in x.
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3.8.2 Fujita and Ramey (2007) Replication
The basic MP model is yet a simpler version of the presented simple model. In
particular x0 = 1 and ρx = σεx = 0. Calibrating the model according to Fujita and
Ramey (2007), with b = 0.9 and ps = 0.039 along with pU = 0.45 and α = 0.5
and normalizing labor market tightness in steady state to one half, yields the desired
results.
This simple model yields a closed form solution for the surplus equation. To solve
for the transition I take the same approach as with the more general models, by
guessing the time-path of θ, solving the surplus equations in each period by backward
induction and then obtaining the unemployment rate for each period by forward
iterating. If the resulting unemployment rate sequence and the guessed θ result in
the value of a vacancy equaling zero in every period I stop. If this is not the case, I
update the guess for θ and repeat.
Figure 3.8 presents the results of this transition for a one-time, unexpected reduc-
tion in aggregate productivity by 0.0078 (ρz = 0.975). The results match Fujita and
Ramey (2007) exactly (they perform a positive shock to aggregate productivity) and
ensure that the algorithm I use is appropriate.
3.8.3 Numerical Solution to Simple Model
This appendix details how to solve for the steady state and transitions of the
simple model.
3.8.3.1 Steady-State Algorithm: Simple Model
The approach here is the same as used for the full model, however it is easier in
application due to the reduced state space, and no on-the-job search. One difference
is that I choose the value of posting a vacancy c to normalize labor market tightness
(as opposed to vacancies) to one. The algorithm for finding the original steady state
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is as follows:
1. Pick the efficiencies of matching, m0 to target contact probability f(θ) that






2. Solve the match surplus using equation (3.4). Be sure to use the targeted contact
probability pT .
3. Use iteration on the flows into and out of each grid point x and unemployment
to pin down the steady state distribution of x among employed workers π̂(x),
and the steady state unemployment rate û. See Section 3.8.3.2 for details.
4. Notice that by choosing m0 to target a contact rate, and normalizing θSS to one,
the vacancy creation condition implies that the vacancy posting cost satisfies:22
c = δm0(1− β)S(x0) (3.12)
Notice that the calibration is performed using simulated data and interpolation, so
that any value of the state variable is admissible. This is because calibration on a grid
results in discontinuous jumps in the simulated moments with continuous movements
in the model’s parameters. However, the steady state distribution of x is computed
on a fixed grid with no interpolation, via flows into and out of these grid points. It
is re-assuring that when simulation does occur on a fixed grid, all the moments are
identical to the flows approach, which is simulation-free. Moreover, if one increases
the number of grid points with the flows approach one asymptotes to the moments of
21In practice, this means targeting a job finding rate of f(θ) = 0.31, as presented in Table 3.1.
22Usually, researchers in this literature normalize labor market tightness to 0.72 so that c/q equals
14 percent of quarterly worker compensation, which is in accordance with the results of Silva and
Toledo (2007), who use Saratoga Institute’s (2004) estimate of the labor costs of posting vacancies.
In this work the θ normalization is simply rigged up so that c/q turns out to be 14 percent of
quarterly worker compensation. In the present setup I could normalize θSS so that c/q was also 14
percent of quarterly worker compensation.
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the simulated data with interpolation. With the number of grid points used the two
approaches render very similar steady-state features.
With the original steady state in hand I proceed to solve the the economy with
aggregate productivity z = z2. The complexity of the algorithm increases because m0
is no longer a free parameter; its calibrated value cannot change from steady state to
steady state. The algorithm for finding this new steady state is as follows:





2. Solve the match surplus bellman equation using equations (3.4). Use the new
contact probability.
3. Use iteration on the flows into and out of each grid point (x, y) and unem-
ployment to pin down the steady state distribution of (x, y) among employed
workers π̂(x, y), and the steady state unemployment rate û. See Section 3.8.3.2
for details.
4. Using equation (3.7) to back out the implied equilibrium labor market tightness
θ̂. If θ̂ and θ0SS2 are close then stop. Otherwise, go back to step (1) with a new
guess for the equilibrium labor market tightness:
θ0SS2 = ζθθ̂ + (1− ζθ)θ
0
SS2
ζθ is chosen small enough so that the procedure converges.
This routine guarantees convergence because the resulting labor market tightness









increase and thus too few workers are in fact hired and too few vacancies are posted
as compared to the equilibrium vacancy rate.
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3.8.3.2 Flows: Simple Model
Before I proceed to outlining the algorithm used for computing transitions I want
to describe the set of flow balance equations used to solve for steady state π̂(x) and
û in the preceding section. The outflows from the unemployment pool include:
• Unemployed agents who find new jobs:
uf





The outflows from a particular (x) grid point of the distribution π(x) include:
• Those that have their idiosyncratic component change to x′ 6= x (including
unemployment):
π(x)(1− P[x′ 6= x|x])
The inflows into a particular (x) grid point of the distribution π(x) include:
• Inflow from all other cells by a change in x; ensuring that current (x)-cell has
positive surplus: ∑
xi 6=x
I{S(x) > 0}π(xi)Px[x′ = x|xi]
23Since π(x) is the unconditional (not conditional on employment) probability of being at x, this
quantity does not need to be multiplied by (1 − u). Also, all these flows are performed on a fixed
grid of x and y. The summations represent discretized integration.
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As one special case, the inflow from unemployment, into cell (x0):
uf
Iterating on these flows yields the steady state distribution π̂(x) and û for corre-
sponding value function Ŝ(x).
3.8.3.3 Transition Algorithm: Simple Model
See the description of the transition solution for the full model as described in
Section 3.8.4.3. The approach here is identical except that I iterate on θt here as
opposed to vt, and θt must satisfy equation (3.6) as opposed to equation (3.9), for all
t. The approach here is simpler because the steady-state distribution depends only
on one state variable and there are no E-E transitions.
3.8.4 Numerical Solution to Full Model
This appendix details how to solve for the steady state and transitions for the full
model.
3.8.4.1 Steady-State Algorithm: Full Model
In order to solve the steady state I begin the economy with aggregate productivity
z = z1.
24 Furthermore, as in any standard Mortensen-Pissarides-style model, c can be
chosen to normalize steady state v. I choose c so that the vacancy rate is normalized
to one (1) in the steady state. The algorithm for finding the original steady state is
as follows:
1. Pick the efficiencies of matching, mU0 and m
E
0 to target contact probabilities
pUT and p
E
T that ensure the correct U-E and E-E transition probabilities respec-
24In practice, z1 = 0.
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= f iT , i ∈ {U,E}.
2. Solve the match surplus using equation (2.4). Be sure to use the targeted contact
probability piT .
3. Use iteration on the flows into and out of each grid point (x, y) and unem-
ployment to pin down the steady state distribution of (x, y) among employed
workers π̂(x, y), and the steady state unemployment rate û. See 3.8.4.2 for
details.
4. Notice that by choosing mi0 to target a contact rate, and normalizing vSS to one,
the vacancy creation condition implies that the vacancy posting cost satisfies:
c = δpUT uEu + pET (1− u)Ee (3.13)
Use π̂(x, y) and û to obtain the right hand side.
As with the simple model the calibration is performed using interpolation while
the steady state distributions of x and y are computed on a fixed grid with no inter-
polation. The two approaches give very similar results for simulated data moments.
With the original steady state in hand I proceed to solve the the economy with
aggregate productivity z = z2. The complexity of the algorithm increases because
mi0 are no longer free parameters; their calibrated values cannot change from steady
state to steady state. The algorithm for finding this new steady state is as follows:








2. Solve the match surplus bellman equation using equations (2.4). Use the new
contact probabilities.
25In practice, this means targeting contact probabilities of around pUT = 0.45 and p
E
T = 0.26, as
presented in Table 2.1.
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3. Use iteration on the flows into and out of each grid point (x, y) and unem-
ployment to pin down the steady state distribution of (x, y) among employed
workers π̂(x, y), and the steady state unemployment rate û. See Section 3.8.4.2
for details.
4. Using the vacancy creation condition (equation 3.9), π̂(x, y) and û back out the
implied equilibrium vacancy rate v̂ (can be solved for in closed form). If v̂ and
v0SS2 are close then stop. Otherwise, go back to step (1) with a new guess for
the equilibrium vacancy rate:
v0SS2 = ζvv̂ + (1− ζv)v
0
SS2
ζv is chosen small enough so that the procedure converges.
This routine guarantees convergence because the resulting vacancy rate (v̂) is









thus too few workers are in fact hired and too few vacancies are posted as compared
to the equilibrium vacancy rate.
3.8.4.2 Flows: Full Model
Before I proceed to outlining the algorithm used for computing transitions I want
to describe the set of flow balance equations used to solve for steady state π̂(x, y) and
û in the preceding section. The outflows from the unemployment pool include:
• Unemployed agents who find new jobs:
upU
The inflows into the unemployment pool include:
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• Exogenous separations for all the employed:
(1− u)ps






π(x, y)I{S(x′, y) ≤ 0}dFx(x′|x)
• Endogenous separations for those with an outside offer, but neither the value






π(x, y)I{max{S(x0, ỹ), S(x′, y)} ≤ 0}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ)
The outflows from a particular (x, y) grid point of the distribution π(x, y) include:
• Those that receive no outside offer, and have their idiosyncratic component
change to x′ 6= x (including unemployment):
(1− pE)(1− ps)π(x, y)(1− P[x′ 6= x|x])







π(x, y)I{S(x0, ỹ) > S(x′, y)}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ)
• Those that receive outside offer and either stay at the current firm with a new
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π(x, y)I{S(x′, y) > S(x0, ỹ)&x′ 6= x}dFx(x′|x)dFy(ỹ)
• Exogenous separations:
π(x, y)ps
The inflows into a particular (x, y) grid point of the distribution π(x, y) include:
• Inflow from all other cells by a change in x, with no outside offer; ensuring that




I{S(x, y) > 0}π(xi, y)Px[x′ = x|xi]
• Inflow from all other cells by a change in x, with an outside offer that is rejected;






I{S(x, y) > 0}π(xi, y)I{max{0, S(x0, ỹ)} ≤ S(x, y)}}Px[x′ = x|xi]
As one special case, the inflow from job changers, i.e. those that get good outside







I{S(x0, yi) > 0}π(xi, y)×
I{S(x0, yi) ≥ S(x, y)&(x 6= x0|yi 6= y)}Px[x′ = x|xi]Py[ỹ = yi|y]
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As another special case, the inflow from unemployment, into cell (x0, y0):
upU
Iterating on these flows yields the steady state distribution π̂(x, y) and û for
corresponding value function Ŝ(x, y).
3.8.4.3 Transition Algorithm: Full Model
I compute a perfect foresight solution that follows Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987),
and much more recently Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010). The idea is to solve for
a time-path of vacancy rates on the transition path that is consistent with optimal
firm and worker choices, and perfect foresight about the evolution of (x, y) among
employed workers. The algorithm looks as follows:
1. Guess when the transition will finish. Call this time period T and impose that
from time T onwards the economy remains in the steady state corresponding
to z2.
2. Guess a sequence of vacancy rates {vt}T−1t=1 .
3. Solve recursively for the functions {S(·, ·, t)}T−1t=1 by iterating backwards in time.26
4. Simulate forward the evolution of {Π(·, ·, t)}Tt=1 and the unemployment rate
{ut}T−1t=1 using the guessed time-path for {vt} and the flow equations presented
in 3.8.4.2.27
5. Using the time-path of Π(·, ·, t), ut and vt, obtain an updated time-path for the
26Recall that from the steady state solution for z2 I have {S(·, ·, T )} which is the steady state
value function associated with z2. In the Bellman equation for {S(·, ·, t)} use pU (vt) and pE(vt).
27Again, note that from the steady solution for p1 I have Π(x, y, 0) and u0, which is where I start
the economy in this simulation. Note that the timing here implies that Π(x, y, t) is the distribution
of (x, y) among employed workers at the beginning of period t. To obtain Π(·, ·, T ) I use the value
functions from the steady state associated with z2.
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vacancy rates ({v̂t}T−1t=1 ) from the vacancy creation condition for every period
(t ∈ 1, 2, . . . , T − 1):28
Vt =− c+ δqU (v̂t)ut max{0, (1− β)S(x0, y0, t+ 1)}+ δqE(v̂t)(1− ut)×∫ ∫ ∫ ∫
I{S(x0, ỹ, t+ 1) > S(x′, y, t+ 1)}max{0, (1− β)S(x0, ỹ, t+ 1)}×
dFx(x
′|x)dFy(ỹ)dΠ̃(x, y, t)
where Vt = 0 for all t due to free entry into vacancies. If the implied time-
path is sufficiently close to the guess, stop. If not, update the guess by selecting
new guesses:
vt = ζvv̂t + (1− ζv)vt
where ζv is chosen small enough to guarantee convergence.
6. Verify that the implied distribution of (x, y) among employed workers, Π(x, y, T )
is sufficiently close to the steady-sate distribution ΠSS2 . If not, choose a larger
T and repeat the whole algorithm.
Notice that I do not need to resort to an algorithm like that presented in Krusell
and Smith (1998) because vacancies have to satisfy only one equation. I do not
need agents to forecast today’s vacancy rate, have them act optimally according
to this forecasted value and then check whether these actions imply the forecasted
vacancy rate. The vacancy rate from the fixed point iteration scheme outlined above
is consistent with the vacancy equation for each time period and microeconomic
behavior is consistent with this vacancy rate.29
28Contacts and match consummation happen before layoffs which occur at the end of the period.
Hence, when considering posting a vacancy, firms take into account the contemporaneous unem-
ployment rate and distribution of (x, y) among employed workers. The realization of the aggregate
shock occurs after wage bargaining and production but before employer-employee contacts occur.
Finally, I use t + 1 value functions in the continuation values because production in consummated
matches occurs at the beginning of the following period.
29In large firm models, for example, each firm needs to forecast today’s labor market tightness, act
in accordance with this labor market tightness, and then the resulting labor market tightness needs
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to be consistent with the forecasted value. This complication arises with heterogeneous decision
makers. One aggregate labor market tightness can come from many distributions of employment
across firms.
93































Figure 3.1: Annual Earnings Losses: Simple Model vs. Data
Note: For simplicity this is the average difference between the annual earnings of a treated individual and the
average earnings of individuals in the control group. The earnings losses are relative to a non-displaced control
group with the same three year tenure requirement as the displaced treatment group. Earnings losses are plotted as
a fraction of average pre-displacement earnings of the treatment group in the four years prior to displacement. For a
definition of displacement and the tenure requirement see the text (Chapter II).
94




























Figure 3.2: Distribution of Idiosyncratic Productivity: Simple Model
Note: Distribution of x in the simple model for the benchmark and high-elasticity calibrations.
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Figure 3.3: (Normalized) Impulse Response to a 1% Permanent, Unexpected Decrease
in Aggregate Productivity: Simple Model (Benchmark Calibration)
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Figure 3.4: (Normalized) Impulse Response to a 1% Permanent, Unexpected Decrease
in Aggregate Productivity: Simple Model (High-Elasticity Calibration)
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of x and y: Full Model
Note: Distribution of x, holding y at yR
avg[x]
, and y, holding x at xR
max[y|S<0] in the full model with baseline




see equation (3.10) in the text. Since these are conditional
probabilities, they sum to one.
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Figure 3.6: (Normalized) Impulse Response to a 1% Permanent, Unexpected Decrease
in Aggregate Productivity: Full Model
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Figure 3.7: (Normalized) Impulse Response to 1% Permanent, Unexpected Increase
in Exogenous Separation Probability: Full Model
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Response to 0.78% Persistent (ρz = 0.975), Unexpected Decrease
in Aggregate Productivity: Basic MP Model
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values for Simple Model
Parameter Meaning Benchmark High Elasticity
ρx Productivity persistence 0.97 same
σεx Std. dev. of innovation to lnx 0.237 0.05
r Real interest rate (A) 0.05 same
f(θ) Job finding probability 0.31 same
b Value of leisure -1.44 0.77
α Matching technology m(v, u) = 0.31vαu1−α 0.5 same
c Vacancy posting cost 3.35 0.31
θ Steady-state v/u ratio (normalized) 1 same
Note: The parenthetical (A) refers to annual estimates.
Table 3.2: Steady-State Features of Simple Model
Statistic Benchmark High Elasticity
Unemployment prob 0.06 same
Separation prob 0.02 same
Job finding prob 0.31 same
Standard deviation of lnw 0.36 0.075
Mean-min wage ratio 1.75 1.13
Note: See Table 3.1 for parameter values for the two calibrations.
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CHAPTER IV
Re-assessing the Earnings Experience of Displaced
Workers
4.1 Introduction
Formal empirical studies of displaced workers started at least 30 years ago and
have developed significantly since then. The most recent studies implement sophis-
ticated empirical techniques using administrative data.1 Most studies find that the
earnings and wage losses of displaced workers are large and extremely persistent,
remaining even 20 years after the displacement event. This chapter studies two pre-
dominant empirical specifications used in the displacement literature and compares
the estimates of the earnings losses of displaced workers. The work focuses on the
control group used in these approaches. The analysis also includes a robustness check
of the most recent empirical specification, and assesses the earnings losses of displaced
workers by individual characteristics.
Studies such as Stevens (1997) and Jacobson et al. (1993) focus on the effects of
displacement using a control group of workers who are never displaced. For exam-
ple, Jacobson et al. (1993) use Pennsylvanian administrative data from 1974 to 1986.
They impose a restriction of six years of tenure at the beginning of 1980 for their
1For a rough progression of the frontier see Ruhm (1987), Topel (1990), Jacobson et al. (1993),
Stevens (1997), Couch and Placzek (2010), and Davis and von Wachter (2011).
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treatment and control groups, and further impose that their control group experience
no displacements in years 1981-1985. The treatment group consists of workers dis-
placed in the years 1981-1985. In other words, the control group is comprised of those
who do not experience an employer separation throughout the observed time periods.
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Stevens (1997) fol-
lows a very similar approach. This analysis also uses the never displaced as a control
group, and focuses on the wage experience of displaced workers around their first and
last displacements.
The main point of this chapter is that the choice of control group significantly
colors the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. In particular, using the never-
displaced as a control group yields larger estimated earnings losses for displaced work-
ers compared to an alternative control group that includes individuals not displaced
this year, but potentially experiencing displacement in other years. Although the
annual displacement probability is not large in any given year, the cumulative prob-
ability of experiencing a displacement is quite large. In a recent paper studying
displaced workers, Davis and von Wachter (2011) report that the annual displace-
ment probability is around 3.5 percent for prime-aged males with three or more years
of job tenure. Between 1980 and 1985, around 16 percent of these males experienced
a job displacement event. Hence, workers who never experience displacement are a
non-random group of individuals. In particular, they tend to have higher average
annual earnings, and therefore the estimated earnings losses for displaced workers
will tend to be larger with this control group.
Since the average worker experiences displacements during his lifetime it might be
natural to include individuals who may experience displacement at some point in their
work history in the control group. Most recently, Davis and von Wachter (2011), based
on work by von Wachter et al. (2007), have used this approach, which gives a different
picture of the earnings losses of displaced workers. In essence, the treatment group is
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made up of those individuals who experience displacement in a particular year, and
the control group is composed of those who do not experience a displacement in a
particular year, but could experience displacement before or after the particular year.
This control group is more representative of the average worker’s experience: they
could avoid displacement this year, but could experience it in the future. Using Social
Security records, the authors find results similar to previous estimates of displaced
worker earnings losses. In this chapter I use this more recent specification, and the
previous empirical approach of Stevens (1997), to estimate the earnings losses of
displaced workers using PSID data. I also present heterogeneity in the recovery of
earnings for different types of workers, shedding light on the possible reasons for
the persistence of earnings losses. Using the PSID, the approach of Davis and von
Wachter (2011) yields very similar results to the estimates using administrative data.
The approach of Stevens (1997) implies much larger earnings losses, as anticipated.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the data
used in this analysis and presents some summary statistics. Section 4.3 outlines the
two empirical approaches used in previous literature. Section 4.4 presents baseline
results for the two specifications, as well as results without any time trends and
a decomposition of the lost earnings into reduced hours and lower wages. Section
4.5 presents results by varying worker characteristics such as age, education, pre-
displacement wealth and time spent unemployed. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data
This chapter examines the heterogeneity in earnings recoveries of displaced workers
using the PSID. The analysis uses an unbalanced panel version of PSID waves 1968-
2009, using both the nationally representative sample and the poverty oversample.2
2Both samples are used to increase sample size and individual weights are used to maintain
national representativeness and to deal with non-random attrition. The baseline results are very
similar with unweighted observations using only the nationally representative sample. Note that
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The sample consists of household heads who, from their first observation as household
heads, have at least three consecutive observations. The final sample includes 15,817
household heads with an average of 16 years on each household head, yielding 250,611
observations.
Job displacements are determined from a question that asks respondents with low
levels of current job tenure “What happened to that employer (job)?” (the individ-
ual’s previous job). The two categories of responses used to identify displacements are
“plant closed/employer moved” and “laid off/fired.” Although fired workers are gen-
erally not considered to be displaced, Boisjoly et al. (1994) report that only 16 percent
of the PSID workers in the laid off/fired category reported being fired. Therefore, the
bias from including these fired workers is likely minimal because they constitute a
small fraction of this category. I include these observations as displacements because
the publically available data make no distinction, and being fired is also a shock to
earnings, so it is not clear that these individuals should be excluded. In the final
sample, there are 12,474 displacements with 6,140 first displacements.
As is well documented by previous authors, the year of displacement is measured
with error in the PSID. The respondent’s answers about earnings and employment
refer to the previous calendar year. For the first sixteen waves of the PSID, the
survey asks what happened to the last job for those reporting a job tenure of less
than one year. Subsequent surveys ask what happened to the previous job if the
current job started since January 1 of the previous calendar year. Due to the timing
of the interviews, job displacements may have occurred either during the previous
calendar year or during the first few months of the current calendar year. For this
study, a recorded displacement is assumed to have occurred during the survey year.
generally those that leave the PSID sample tend to be selected negatively. This would make the
post-displacement earnings estimates presented here biased towards zero. The analysis excludes the
Latino and immigrant supplement samples. Household head earnings data are available, using sup-
plement files, for all years except 2005. Household head labor hours are available with supplemental
files for all years except 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009.
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Finally, as is common with displaced worker studies using the PSID, household heads
who report a displacement in the 1968 wave are excluded from the analysis because
this displacement may have occurred any time in the 10 years prior to the survey.
Summary statistics for never-displaced household heads and displaced household
heads are presented in Table 4.1. Consistent with previous literature, displaced in-
dividuals tend to be younger than the never displaced at the time of the shock.
Displaced workers are slightly less educated than the never displaced, although this
difference is not significant.3 In addition, displaced workers are more likely to originate
from the manufacturing sector and blue collar jobs.4 Finally, 62 percent of household
heads report never being displaced and 38 percent report at least one displacement
during their observations.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
There are two main specifications that authors have used to assess the earnings
losses of displaced workers. The first specification focuses on the first displacement
and, with some slight variations, takes the following form:
eit = αi + γt + λit+Xitβ +
m+u∑
k=−ml
Dkitδk + εit (4.1)
where eit are the annual earnings of household head i at time t, αi and γt represent
individual and time fixed effects respectively, λi allow for individual linear time trends,
and Dkit equal one if individual i was displaced for the first time k periods ago at time t.
Xit includes time varying worker characteristics. The analysis treats those ml periods
3For education I implement the cleaning method of Stephens (2001). Although years of education
may change during the sample, I force it to be constant. To determine the years of education, I take
the most recent, non-missing observation from the family file. If years of education are still missing
I take the most recent, non-missing years of education from the individual file.
4White collar jobs include professional and technical workers, managers and administrators, sales
workers and clerical workers. Blue collar jobs include craftsmen, operatives, transport equipment
operatives and laborers.
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before their first displacement as part of the control group, and those mu or more years
after their first displacement are captured in the last dummy variable. Here the ‘+’
denotes that those mu periods or more after displacement are pooled to estimate the
coefficient on the last dummy. Note that the control group for this regression are those
workers that never experience displacement because these workers have Dkit = 0∀k, as
well as individuals who are more than ml periods before their first displacement. This
control group serves as an extreme benchmark because the never displaced are a select
group of individuals. This specification forces the displacement dummy coefficients
to take on the same value for all displaced cohorts. This specification finds its roots
in Jacobson et al. (1993) and has been used for decades in studies such as Stevens
(1997) and Couch and Placzek (2010). From now on I refer to this specification as
the ‘Stevens’ specification.5
Sometimes this equation is specified with log earnings on the left hand side which
delivers percent changes in earnings. This approach excludes all observations with
zero annual earnings. These observations constitute a significant portion of the ob-
servations. Sometimes the level losses estimated using equation (4.1) are reported as
a fraction of the treatment group’s average pre-displacement earnings.6 I include ob-
servations with zero earnings in my analysis and report losses as a fraction of average
earnings prior to initial displacement.
An alternative specification alters the control group for every displaced cohort, by
calendar year. In order to remain consistent with a recent study by Davis and von
Wachter (2011) I follow their approach. In particular, for every displacement year y
5I choose to refer to it as the ‘Stevens’ specification rather than referencing Jacobson et al.
(1993) because Stevens (1997) applied this specification in a way that is most comparable to the
work presented here.
6Since this chapter is in some sense an update of Stevens (1997), I present a comparison to the
results of Stevens in Section 4.7.
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All the notation is the same as before, and ēyi represents the average earnings of
individual i using the years y − 5 to y − 1. In year y the treatment group are
those displaced in year y. The control group can be those individuals that are not
displaced in year y. Alternatively, they could be individuals who do not separate
from their employer in year y.7 Importantly, now the control group are individuals
who are not separated from their employer this year, but could have been displaced
in previous years or could be displaced in future years.8 This control group captures
the average worker’s experience, because individuals that are not displaced this year
face the risk of displacement in the future, and faced it in the past. For the control
group one sets Dkit,y = 0∀k so that the δ
y
k coefficients capture the earnings deviations
from this control group, and the control group identifies the year fixed effects. One
omits a time-relative-to-displacement-year dummies so that it is zero by construction.
This approach yields a set of δyk coefficients for every year y. One way to present
these coefficients is to average them and obtain a mean treatment effect across the
years. Notice that this approach allows the displacement dummy coefficients to vary
with each displacement cohort. As with the first specification, these losses are often
expressed as a fraction of the treatment group’s average pre-displacement annual
earnings. This specification appears in Davis and von Wachter (2011) and I refer to
it as the Davis-von Wachter specification from now on.
7To raise sample sizes I take those displaced in year y, y + 1 and y + 2 as the relevant treatment
group, and those who do not separate from their employer in years y, y+ 1 and y+ 2 as the relevant
control group. This follows Davis and von Wachter (2011).
8Since the control group do not separate from their position in y, y + 1 and y + 2 they are
restricted to employment for a couple of years after time y.
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4.4 Baseline Results
This section presents earnings estimates for the two main specifications, as well as
a robustness check that does not include individual specific time trends. The earnings
losses are decomposed into reduced employment and lower wages.
4.4.1 Earnings
The two approaches outlined in the previous section yield potentially different
results. Using the PSID I estimate both equations and present the results in Figure
4.1. The results here are the δk coefficients from equation (4.1) divided by the average
earnings of the treatment group over the four years prior to displacement, and an
average of the δyk coefficients from equation (4.2) divided by the pre-displacement
average earnings of the treatment group. For the latter, I estimate the equation for
years 1972 through 1997.9
The two control groups paint a very different picture of the earnings consequences
for displaced workers. First, the pre-displacement dip is a little different, with the
never-displaced specification suggesting smaller downward movements prior to dis-
placement. This follows from the fact that the never-displaced specification refers to
the first displacement, so agents do not experience substantial reductions in earnings
prior to this job loss. In the Davis-von Wachter specification earnings tend to fall
prior to displacement as agents may experience more turbulent earnings experiences
prior to the shock because this is not necessarily their first displacement. Further-
more, the Stevens specification controls for individual linear time trends to account for
unobserved characteristics that could lower rates of earnings growth. The Davis-von
Wachter approach controls for this with a more flexible specification by allowing the
9I set m+u to 11
+. Furthermore, all regressions include a quartic in worker age. I do not restrict
the tenure or age of the treatment and control groups. This is partly due to sample size issues and
partly due to the fact that since the PSID offers the reason for the separation of a respondent we
do not need tenure as in much of the displacement literature using mass layoffs.
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year effects to vary proportionally to the worker’s pre-displacement average earnings.
These trends could pick up the effects of displacement and I return to this point in
Section 4.4.2.
On impact the Stevens and Davis-von Wachter approaches yield comparable esti-
mates of earnings losses: around 30 percent. This suggests that the choice of empirical
model is inconsequential for the on-impact affect of displacement on earnings. The
recovery, however, is quite different for the two specifications. The Davis-von Wachter
approach suggests a 10 percent earnings recovery in the 10 years following displace-
ment, whereas the Stevens specification suggests that earnings, after only a slight
initial recovery, continue to fall and are even lower 10 years after the first displace-
ment. The choice of control group markedly alters the results and the interpretation
of these results.
4.4.2 Excluding Individual Specific Time Trends
The Stevens approach outlined thus far includes individual linear time trends
and the Davis-von Wachter approach allows a worker’s pre-displacement earnings
to interact with the aggregate time trends in affecting earnings growth. It is not
clear that these are the right approaches. In particular, individual time trends could
pick up some of the effects of displacement if displacement truly has a permanent
effect on earnings. Hence, the two approaches are likely to understate the earnings
losses associated with displacement because part of the displacement effect will be
picked up by the individual time trend. In both specifications, including individual
fixed effects suggests that time-invariant worker attributes that affect earnings do
not pose a problem. Different trends in counterfactual earnings for the control group
and the displaced workers based on unobservables may introduce a bias, which the
specification in this section ignores.
In order to avoid attributing the effect of displacement on earnings to a time trend,
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which is the Davis-von Wachter approach with no individual time trends.10
Figure 4.2 presents the results of the Davis-von Wachter specification in the pre-
vious section, as well as results for the specification in equation (4.3), and, as a
reference, the original empirical results from Davis and von Wachter (2011), using
Social Security administrative data. First, notice that the Davis-von Wachter spec-
ification, with data from the PSID, gives results that are very similar to the results
using Social Security administrative data. On impact both approaches imply earnings
losses of around 30 percent. The recovery in earnings is very similar over the next 10
years, with annual earnings rising by around 15 percent. The two data sets provide
different ideas of pre-displacement earnings losses, with the PSID sample suggesting
much larger losses in years prior to displacement.
Figure 4.2 also highlights that omitting individual specific trends in the speci-
fication can significantly affect the estimated earnings losses of displaced workers.
Without time trends, earnings losses on impact are about 15 percent larger, which
increases the present value of earnings losses dramatically in comparison to the Davis-
von Wachter specification with individual time trends.11 Therefore, as expected, the
interaction between pre-displacement earnings and the aggregate time trend serves
to soak up some of the displacement effect. On the other hand, without controlling
for individual time trends, unobservable characteristics affecting earnings growth for
10Including individual linear time trends, as in the Stevens specification, would be mis-leading in
the Davis-von Wachter approach. Variation in earnings prior to year ml before displacement would
identify the individual linear time trend. Since individuals can experience displacement in these
periods this would serve to bias the estimate of the trends downwards which would suggest a quicker
post-displacement earnings recovery. Empirical analysis confirms this suspicion.
11Davis and von Wachter (2011), and a closely related paper von Wachter et al. (2007), do not
present results without individual time trends, so it is difficult to compare the results using PSID
data with the results using administrative data.
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the displaced, relative to the control group, bias the estimated earnings losses. In
order to remain comparable to previous literature, I present earnings losses using the
Davis-von Wachter specification with individual time trends.
4.4.3 Decomposition into Wages and Hours
In order to assess fully the implications of displacement on workers, it is important
to decompose the earnings losses into lower wages and reduced hours worked. To
measure hours worked I use individual responses to the labor hours worked question
in the PSID, and to measure wages I use labor earnings divided by labor hours (hourly
earnings).
Figure 4.3 presents the earnings, wages and hours time-profiles around a dis-
placement, using the specification in equation (4.2) and dividing by pre-displacement
averages. This plot tells a consistent story with Figure 4.1.12 The reduction in earn-
ings prior to displacement in the Davis-von Wachter approach comes largely due to
the reduction in hours, which fall by around 15 percent. Wages hold somewhat steady
prior to separation and fall by around 5 percent. On impact the reduction in hours
is responsible for around two-thirds of the reduction in earnings, with the remainder
explained by a reduction in wages. In the short-run, earnings recover largely due
to a rise in hours worked, with the wage remaining at on-impact levels. Both the
on-impact reduction and quick recovery in hours worked are consistent with previ-
ous studies, such as Topel (1990). Within five years, hours have returned to their
pre-displacement levels, and the long run losses are driven by reduced wages.
12The percent losses in wages and hours do not sum perfectly to the percent losses in earnings
because hours are not available in even years after 1997 so these observations are not included in
the hours and hourly earnings regressions. Moreover, for the wage regression I trim wage below one
dollar an hour and above $100 dollars an hour.
113
4.5 Losses by Worker Characteristics
In this section I report different earnings recoveries by worker characteristics. The
main point of this section is to show that, although the incidence of displacement
varies substantially across groups, the effects of displacement conditional on incidence
affects all workers, including the young and the old, workers with different levels of
education, workers from various industries and occupations, and the poor and the rich.
Given the previous analysis, I use the Davis-von Wachter approach with individual
specific time trends from here on out. I estimate equation (4.3) but for different sub-
populations.13 With regard to the model presented in Chapter II, the universality of
displaced worker earnings losses is somewhat important because the model features
ex-ante homogeneous workers. This means that the model predicts that all sub-
populations of workers will lose identical amounts, on average, from displacement.
This section shows that all workers face significant and persistent earnings losses after
displacement. At the same time, the magnitude of these losses varies by sub-groups.
4.5.1 Age
Figure 4.4 presents results by the worker’s age at the time of displacement.14
Workers of all ages face significant costs of displacements in the short and medium
run. The earnings of the oldest workers (51-60 year olds) fall by more than 40 percent
on impact. Other workers lose around 30 percent on impact. In the long run all
workers experience similar earnings losses which means that older workers, on average,
experience a faster recovery. These results are consistent with Davis and von Wachter
(2011) in that they find that older workers lose more on impact but experience a faster
recovery in earnings than younger workers.
13This is in contrast to adding interaction terms for each sub-population. The specification I run is
more general because it allows all the parameters of the empirical model to differ by sub-population,
which avoids attributing earnings losses due to differential time trends to displacement.
14For these regressions I use an individual’s observations only if in that year the worker is at most
65 years old.
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These separate regressions by age are a decomposition of the average effect in
Figure 4.1 where each age group’s outcome is weighted by the probability of that
group conditional on displacement. Table 4.2 provides an idea of the differential
incidence of displacement as well as the overall probability of a group appearing in
the sample. The PSID has slightly more younger workers than older workers, and
among displaced workers the young are over-represented. This is consistent with
Table 4.1 in that the average age of the displaced is far smaller than the average age
of the never displaced.
4.5.2 Education
Figure 4.5 shows the results by education group. These findings are somewhat
consistent with other studies, like Stevens (1997). Individuals with varying education
levels tend to have the same rate of recovery in earnings after displacement. However,
the on-impact effect is non monotonic in education. Those with more education tend
to lose less on impact. This relationship breaks down with the most educated, who
tend to lose more than those with some college and about the same as those with
a high school degree. Those with less than a high school education experience a 40
percent reduction in earnings in the year of displacement. They experience roughly
a 15 percent recovery in earnings over the next 10 years. Those with some college
experience only a 20 percent reduction in earnings at the time of displacement and
recover almost fully after 10 years. One plausible interpretation for these results is
that workers without a high school degree, compared to higher skilled workers, might
be less flexible and possess less general human capital, making their earnings losses
more severe. The non-monotonicity in earnings losses could be explained by those
with some college having less access to high paying jobs to begin with, compared to
those with a completed college degree. This would mean that those with some college
might have less to lose than those with a completed college degree. Table 4.2 shows
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that education does not really shelter individuals from displacement. Those with
a bachelor degree or more are slightly under-represented in the group of displaced
workers.
4.5.3 Routine vs. Non-Routine Jobs
Figure 4.6 shows the results by pre-displacement occupation. I take an individual’s
occupation two years prior to displacement as their pre-displacement occupation. I
run the Davis-von Wachter specification for each occupation separately. I group the
two-digit occupations available in the PSID into three categories: non-routine cogni-
tive, non-routine manual and routine jobs.15 There exists a literature documenting
the disappearance of wages from the middle of the wage distribution, largely charac-
terized by routine jobs, and a rise in high paying non-routine jobs and lower paying
non-routine manual jobs.16 The hypothesis is that since these well paying routine
jobs are disappearing workers displaced from these occupations might suffer larger
losses, because they are less likely to secure an equally paying job post-displacement.
Figure 4.6 does not bear this out. Individuals losing jobs in routine occupations, in
percent terms, lose about the same as the other occupations and their recovery looks
very similar to the other occupations.
4.5.4 Low Wage and High Wage Industries
Figure 4.7 shows the results by pre-displacement industry. I group the industries
into relatively low paying industries and relatively high paying industries, as discussed
by Krueger and Summers (1988).17 Often economists argue that there are some rents
15Non-routine cognitive occupations include professional, technical, management, business and fi-
nancial occupations. Routine jobs include clerical, administrative support, sales workers, craftsmen,
foremen, operatives, installation, maintenance and repair occupations, production and transporta-
tion occupations and laborers. Non-routine manual jobs include service workers. These labels are
based on Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
16See, for example, Goos and Manning (2007) and Autor et al. (2008).
17I place mining, construction, manufacturing and transportation, communications and other
public utilities, along with finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) in the high wage industries,
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in high paying industries that are unexplained by union status, compensating wage
differentials, or general skills. One might think that losing these types of jobs via a
displacement might be much more detrimental to a worker’s earnings than losing a low
paying job. There exists some evidence for this, although both groups of workers suffer
significantly following a displacement. Workers losing jobs in high paying industries
suffer a 30 percent reduction in earnings on impact, while workers losing jobs in low
paying industries suffer a 20 percent reduction in earnings on impact. The earnings
recovery for these individuals looks very similar, although individuals from high wage
industries do experience larger long run losses than displaced individuals originating
from low wage industries (20 percent vs. 10 percent). The large and persistent losses
across these two groups of workers suggests that rents are not solely responsible for
the large earnings losses of displaced workers. Table 4.2 shows that many workers
are in high-paying industries, although displaced workers are equally represented by
workers from low wage and high wage industries.
4.5.5 Wealth
Theoretically it is not clear who should lose more, those with large wealth or
those with little wealth. On the one hand, those with little wealth might be more
liquidity constrained, and their marginal value of consumption tends to be higher,
which would suggest a quicker recovery simply because of need. On the other hand,
those with little wealth might not have the resources to pursue new opportunities,
because they cannot, for example, move to a more prosperous geographic region. The
PSID issued wealth supplements every five years from 1984 to 1999, and every other
year thereafter till 2007. This supplemental wealth data are very thorough measuring
assets such as net value of business assets, checking and savings accounts, value of
and wholesale and retail trade, business and repair services, and personal services in the low paying
industries. According to this categorization the average (across all observations) hourly earnings in
the high wage industries is around $23 per hour and the average in the low wage industries is around
$18 per hour.
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shares of stock and the value of all debts.
I estimate equation (4.2) where the groups are poor and wealthy workers at the
time of displacement, deflating wealth to 2007 dollars. Measured wealth tends to be
very noisy. As an example the average within standard deviation of wealth is around
$140,000. To ameliorate this issue, I use the average wealth of an individual over all
wealth observation instead of the actual wealth in a given year. In order to estimate
the Davis-von Wachter regression for all years, as before, I apply the average wealth
of an individual to all their observations and use this in the baseline specification.
This approach ignores the fact that displaced workers may draw down their wealth
and hence be poorer on average. Poor workers are those below the 25th percentile in
the wealth distribution in year y and the wealthy are those above the 75th percentile
in the wealth distribution.18
Figure 4.8 presents the losses by wealth in the year of displacement, where the
losses are divided by the appropriate group’s pre-displacement earnings. The results
suggest that, in the short run, poorer workers suffer considerably greater earnings
losses than richer workers. On impact, the poor suffer a 45 percent reduction in
earnings whereas the rich see a 30 percent reduction. A brief glance at the hours
worked of these two categories suggests that this is the culprit, while wages move
almost identically for the rich and the poor. This implies that poorer workers find it
more difficult to find work and pre-displacement work hours. This effect persists for
around 10 years following displacement.
Table 4.2 highlights that conditional on displacement the poor are over-represented.
It turns out that three out of four displaced workers are poor workers. Hence, not
only do poor workers suffer greater earnings reductions from displacement, they are
far more likely to experience displacement.
18This finding is robust to other choices of the poor/wealthy cutoffs, such as 20/80 and 15/85.
As an example, the 25th percentile in the 1984 wealth distribution was about $4000 and the 75th
percentile in the 1984 wealth distribution was about $130,000 (2007 dollars).
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4.5.6 Length of Unemployment Spell
Another interesting dimension of the effect of displacement on worker’s earnings is
through reduced human capital. Authors in the past have speculated that increased
time out of work can extend the losses of a workers’ human capital and adversely
affect their earnings. Respondents in the PSID are asked how many weeks they spent
unemployed or on temporary layoff in the previous year (or since January 1 of the
previous year). Figure 4.9 presents results for the earnings of displaced workers by
the time spent unemployed from specification (4.2). On impact, those that spend
more time unemployed obviously have larger dip in earnings because they are out of
work for longer. This difference in earnings persists, even 10 years after displacement.
This suggests that the loss of human capital while unemployed, if it exists, does have
long run consequences for displaced workers.
4.5.7 Displacement vs. Unemployment Spell
Finally, the model in Chapter II makes no substantive distinction between a dis-
placement, a layoff or a generic period of unemployment. An unemployment spell
in the model, no matter how short or for what reason, causes the worker to start at
the bottom of the job ladder. Figure 4.10 presents results for those that experience
displacement along with those that experience at least three months of unemploy-
ment.19 The results suggest that the difference between a displacement and a period
of unemployment is very minimal, with both events resulting in similar on-impact
effects and similar recovery trajectories. On impact those with at least three months
of unemployment suffer slightly more than the average displaced workers, but condi-
tioning on at least three months of unemployment for the displaced workers suggests
a very similar earnings profile, as depicted in Figure 4.9. This similarity between the
19I choose at least three months of unemployment to avoid those on temporary lay off, which
rarely exceeds three months.
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two events bodes well for the theoretical framework developed in Chapter II of this
dissertation.
4.5.8 Occupation/Industry Stayers and Switchers
Figure 4.11 shows the results by a worker’s switching status by occupation and

























where everything is as before except now I also interact the displacement dummies
with particular groups (G). For example, I might be interested in the differential
effect on earnings of being displaced and switching industries. In this case I would set
DGi = 1 for all workers who switched industries, and D
G
i = 0 for those who did not
switch industries.21 The effect on earnings for displaced industry switchers is δyk +ϕ
y
k
and the effect on earnings for those displaced, but staying in their pre-displacement
industry, is simply δyk .
22
Figure 4.11 shows that those that switch industries suffer larger losses than those
that remain within their pre-displacement industry. Switching occupations seems to
have little impact on the earnings trajectory for displaced workers. These results are
more in line with work that highlights industry-specific human capital rather than
20The approach allows for the sub-population to be all workers, as opposed to all stayers or all
switchers, which ignores the fact that other parameters of the model, such as aggregate trends, may
differ by these two sub-populations.
21As before, the pre-displacement industry is taken from two years before the displacement shock.
The post-displacement industry is taken five years after year y, except in years when this does not
exist because of the biennial nature of the PSID after 1997. Then I take the industry six years after
year y. For example, in survey year 1995, the industry five years after displacement does not exist
because survey year 2000 does not exist. Therefore I take the industry from the survey in 2001.
22Note that the group dummies are based on pre-displacement characteristics and remain fixed




This chapter implements two popular empirical specifications in the displaced
worker literature. The original specification, used in the seminal paper Jacobson et al.
(1993), uses the never displaced as a control group. In a more recent implementation,
those that are not displaced in a particular year, but could be displaced in past and
future years, serve as the control group. This chapter shows that the two specifications
give very different notions of the recovery of displaced worker earnings. Since the never
displaced have higher earnings, on average, the original specification implies larger
earnings losses than the more recent specification. Furthermore, not controlling for
individual time trends in the recent specification increases the long run earnings losses
associated with displacement. This suggests that individual linear time trends soak
up some of the earnings effect of displacement.
Aside from this methodological contribution, this chapter also presents results for
earnings trajectories by worker characteristics. Some results are simple affirmations
of previous work. For example, there tends to be a hump-shaped response of earnings
losses by worker education. Those with some college tend to loses less than those who
have completed a college degree. These in turn tend to lose less than those without
a high school degree. Another result supports previous findings that older workers
tend to lose more earnings in the year of the displacement, but experience a faster
earnings recovery than younger workers.
Some results are novel. For example, I document that those losing jobs character-
ized by routine tasks and non-routine (cognitive or manual) tasks suffer very similar
earnings losses. This presents cursory evidence that the hollowing out of the wage
distribution, which includes mostly routine jobs, is not responsible for the large earn-
23See, for example, Neal (1995) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2009).
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ings losses of displaced workers. The results also suggest that whether workers start
out in high paying industries or low paying industries, their earnings losses are large
and persistent. This means that rents in high-paying industries cannot explain the
earnings losses of displaced workers. Finally, to my knowledge, this study presents the
first results for displaced worker earnings losses by wealth. Poor workers tend to lose
more than rich workers, at least in the short run, and the poor are dis-proportionally
affected by displacements. The larger earnings losses for the poor seem to be a result
of poorer workers failing to find sufficient work, leaving them under-employed. The
recovery in hourly earnings for the rich and the poor looks very similar.
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4.7 Appendix: Stevens (1997) Replication
Here I restrict the sample to the sample used by Stevens (1997); that is I use
a balanced sample of household heads from 1968 to 1988. As in Stevens (1997) I
also impose that an individual have at least one positive earnings observation. These
restrictions leave 1,609 individuals, which is very close to 1,606 in the original study.
550 individuals experience at least one displacement and the sample is largely male
(80 percent). This is slightly different from Stevens’ sample which is 84 percent male
and has 441 people experiencing at least one displacement. Table 4.3 reports the
number of displacement and first displacements for my sample and Stevens’ sample.
The numbers are similar, although there are apparent discrepancies. For example, in
1985 I find around 61 individuals displaced, where Stevens only finds 39 displaced.
I tend to code more displacement than Stevens. Stevens (1997) attempts to control
for the same displacement being reported more than once. I attempt to do the same,
but if that was the only issue, first displacements should be identical. Although the
numbers are very close in these two columns, my replication continues to find more
first displacements than Stevens. I have not found a way to reconcile these two sets
of results.
I estimate the same specification as Stevens and report the results in Figure 4.12.
The top plot shows the results of my replication alongside the original results for
the specification without individual linear time trends and the bottom plot includes
individual linear time trends. I only report the results for annual earnings after the
first displacement, although the results for the hourly wage and the last displacement
are quite similar. The figure shows that the replication is very good. The specification
with individual linear time trends shows an on-impact dip of around 27 percent versus
31 percent in the original study. After 10 years, the replication shows earnings losses
of around seven percent versus nine percent in Stevens (1997). This confirms that
the analysis is consistent with previous work and grants credibility to the rest of the
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work presented in this chapter.
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Figure 4.1: Effect of Displacement on Head’s Income: Stevens versus Davis-von
Wachter specifications using PSID data
Note: Both equations include dummies four years before the displacement shock and 11+ years after the
displacement shock. In the annual regressions I include individuals displaced in years y, y + 1 and y + 2 to increase
sample size. These regressions are estimated for 1972 through to 1997. The control group for these annual
regressions are those not experiencing separation from their employer (at current job for more than 12 months). The
results are similar for a control group of non-displaced workers. I plot the average of the δyk coefficients. The analysis
applies individual weights from the PSID, but the results are very similar with unweighted observations using only
the Survey Research Center (SRC) sample. In contrast to Davis and von Wachter (2011), I do not impose age,
tenure and positive earnings requirements. This is due to sample size limitations in the PSID and the unreliability of
tenure information in the PSID.
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Davis and von Wachter (2011) estimates (expansion)
Davis and von Wachter (2011) estimates (recession)
PSID data (Davis−von Wachter specification without trends)
PSID data (Davis−von Wachter specification)
Figure 4.2: Income Around Displacement: Individual Specific Time Trends
Note: Shows the empirical results from Davis and von Wachter (2011) and the baseline results from this chapter.
The solid line does not include any individual time trends.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of Displacement on Head’s Hours and Wages
Note: See Figure 4.1 note. The estimates for wages and hours do not include observations for even years after 1997
because these do not exist in the data. To remove outliers, the wage regression does not include observations that
have wages below one dollar an hour and above $100 an hour. This removes estimates below the first percentile and
above the 99 percentile in terms of annual hourly earnings.
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Figure 4.4: Effect of Displacement by Age
Note: This analysis uses the age at the time of displacement. Also, these results include observations only if in that
year the individual is at most 65 years old.
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Bach Deg or more
Figure 4.5: Effect of Displacement by Education Level
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Figure 4.6: Effect of Displacement by Occupations
Note: Individuals grouped by their occupation two years prior to the displacement shock. Non-routine cognitive
occupations include professional, technical, management, business and financial occupations. Routine jobs include
clerical, administrative support, sales workers, craftsmen, foremen, operatives, installation, maintenance and repair
occupations, production and transportation occupations and laborers. Non-routine manual jobs include service
workers.
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Figure 4.7: Effect of Displacement by Industries
Note: Individuals grouped by their industry two years prior to the displacement shock. I place mining, construction,
manufacturing and transportation, communications and other public utilities, along with FIRE in the high wage
industries, and wholesale and retail trade, business and repair services, and personal services in the low paying
industries.
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Figure 4.8: Effect of Displacement by Wealth
Note: In order to to estimate the DV regression for all years, as before, I apply the average wealth of an individual
to all their observations and use this in the baseline specification. Poor workers are those below the 25th percentile
in the wealth distribution in year y and the wealthy are those above the 75th percentile in the wealth distribution.
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Displaced and less than 3 months ue
Displaced and more than 3 months ue
Figure 4.9: Losses by Time Spent Unemployed
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More than 3 months unemployed
Figure 4.10: Displacement vs. Unemployment
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Figure 4.11: Effect of Displacement by Industry and Occupation Stayers/Switchers
Note: Individuals are categorized as switchers and stayers according to their 1-digit industry and occupation codes.
The pre-displacement occupation/industry is taken from two years before the displacement shock. The
post-displacement occupation/industry is taken five years after year y, except in years when this does not exist
because of the biennial nature of the PSID after 1997. Then I take the industry six years after year y. For example,
in survey year 1995, the industry five years after displacement does not exist because survey year 2000 does not
exist. Therefore I take the industry from the survey in 2001.
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Figure 4.12: Stevens (1997) and Replication Results
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Never Displaced First Displacement Any Displacement
Head’s age 47.3 32.9 34.5
Head’s education 12.2 12.1 12.0
Head’s annual earnings ($) 35288 32403 29188
Head’s hourly earnings ($) 23.2 17.7 16.7
Head’s occupation
Percentage white collar 49.2 37.0 31.3
Percentage blue collar 35.0 47.9 52.6
Head’s industry
Percentage manufacturing 19.9 26.8 26.4
Fraction of household heads 61.2 38.8 38.8
Note: Unweighted tabulations using unbalanced data from the 1968-2009 PSID surveys. Dollar figures are in 2007
dollars using the CPI-U-X1. Averages for the never displaced individuals are calculated using every observation for
these individuals. Averages for displaced individuals are calculated using the observation from the year of the shock.
Pre-displacement industry, occupation, wages and earnings are taken from two years prior to the shock. The analysis
uses the retrospective occupation and industry where available (1968-1980) and the original industry and occupation
codes elsewhere (1981-2009). Education is top coded at 16 years and is forced to be constant for every individual.
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Less than HS 0.29 0.30
HS 0.32 0.35
Some college 0.19 0.21
Bach deg or more 0.20 0.14
Occupation
Non-routine cog 0.18 0.13
Routine 0.69 0.75
Non-routine man 0.12 0.12
Industry
High Wage 0.61 0.65
Low Wage 0.28 0.35
Wealth
High Wealth 0.25 0.25
Low Wealth 0.25 0.75
Note: Unweighted tabulations using unbalanced data from the 1968-2009 PSID surveys. Dollar figures are in 2007
dollars using the CPI-U-X1. The probability of being in a given category is obtained by using all non-missing
observations. This does not have to sum to one because the categories are not necessarily all-inclusive. The
displacement refers to the first displacement although the results are similar if the event is any displacement.
Pre-displacement industry and occupation are taken from two years prior to the shock. High wealth individuals are
above the 75th percentile in the wealth distribution and low wealth individuals are below the 25th percentile in the
wealth distribution. This uses the mean wealth applied to all years as described in the text.
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Table 4.3: Number of Displacements by Year: Stevens (1997) Replication
Year First Displacements Displacements
Stevens Me Stevens Me
1969 44 42 44 42
1970 43 48 40 41
1971 58 62 48 49
1972 53 68 35 36
1973 37 46 27 32
1974 37 40 25 25
1975 54 63 36 40
1976 41 66 24 35
1977 43 65 18 23
1978 34 53 16 22
1979 25 32 11 15
1980 35 44 14 18
1981 41 59 23 30
1982 42 60 21 27
1983 41 64 21 30
1984 31 60 13 19
1985 39 61 14 20
1986 36 55 11 14
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